Author: Nino Chanadiri

 

At the beginning of June, the 2024 European elections were held. The elections were accompanied by a great sense of curiosity in and outside the EU. The question was whether centrist powers would be able to secure enough places to maintain the established political path and priorities, or whether the elections would bring victory to more radical powers, reflecting the growing tendencies at the national levels in the recent years. When the results aired, it was clear that even though more populist and mostly far-right powers had gained more votes than in the previous elections in 2019, the centrist powers like European People’s Party (EPP), with the most votes, and others, had secured a victory in the elections which ensures that the EU’s political course and priorities, especially related to European security and issues like Ukraine, remains unchanged.

Source: Politico (https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/european-parliament-election/)

Challenges at the national levels: France in the spotlight

However, at the national levels, the success of the far-right populist parties was more visible. It was especially the case in France, where the National Rally (RN) party secured 31.5% of votes, leaving President Macron’s Renaissance party (at 15.2%) behind. RN thus became the first French party to receive more than 30% of the votes since 1984.  In response, Macron dissolved the parliament and scheduled snap elections to reduce the risks of future victory for the far-right. It is also noteworthy that Macron has been in controversy with both the right and left extremes, as he views both sides as radical powers unable to build descent projects for France. The result of the elections turned out unexpected and failed to repeat the tendency of the EU elections in France where participation on national level was 51.5%.  While first round of voting happened to be successful for RN, where it secured the first place with the highest number of votes,  the second round that was held on 7th of July ended up with left-wing alliance gaining the highest number of seats yet not enough for the guaranteed capabilities to form the government. Thus hard work to make alliances continues to have a great importance.

France was not the only one. Concerns were spread regarding Germany too, where Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), a radical party known for scandals related to vague quotes about the SS, the Nazi paramilitaries, as well as for its sympathies to Russia, scored second place in the European elections after the Christian Democrats, leaving the Social Democrats (Olaf Scholz’s party) behind. The results were surprising; however, they could not overshadow the French topic. In Germany, the “first place winner” was an EPP group member with less radical views than the AfD or French RN. AfD is known for its skeptical attitude towards supporting Ukraine and President Zelensky, and for supporting negotiations with Russia.

 

Will the far-right gain power in the EU?

Other countries with successful far-right parties were Italy, where prime minister Meloni’s party secured a victory; Austria, where the far-right has been gaining sympathy at the national level; and, as per tradition, Hungary, where Fidesz (Orban’s party) won the elections, however, showed the worst results at the national level in the last two decades.

The far-right in the EU parliament now holds about 156 seats altogether, and, as such, now, the main question is whether they will manage to coordinate to make shifts in EU politics. It is difficult to answer this question, as they differ from each other in their stands on a number of issues. One example is Ukraine, which has become the most important focus in European politics not only at the EU level, but also at the individual nation levels too. As already noted, AfD, which has a place in the EU Parliament, is supporting negotiations with Russia, while the French RN has been experiencing changes in the pro-Kremlin rhetoric to more or less moderate. The young leader of the party, Jordan Bardella (expected to become prime minister if his party wins the elections), has named Russia as a threat for both Europe and France. He stated that he will continue supporting Ukraine, however, there will be a red line in terms of providing Ukraine the ability to strike Russian cities, so as to avoid escalation. The red line also crosses sending French military personnel in Ukraine too.

Another example can be found in The European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), the party of the Italian PM Meloni. The party, which generally describes itself as a constructive center-right force which aims to bring reforms to the EU and to strengthen nation states, secured a place for itself in the EU parliament. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, ECR has been positioning itself as a supporter of Ukraine, and Meloni herself has been quite loud in her anti-Russian rhetoric. The recent examples include her assessment of Putin’s desire for negotiations as propaganda that suggests that “Ukraine must withdraw from Ukraine.”

Thus, as there is also a diversity among far-right parties, the potential for them to unite in strength on the EU parliamentary scene will stand on their ability to cooperate more closely, which might be challenging due to their differences. It also is expected that the center will be able to maintain power pressure on them on critical issues.

However, even though, for now, at the EU level, the previous status quo has not been dramatically shaken, it does not mean the tendency for strengthening among the radical left and right wing powers, which show little difference in populist rhetoric, should be left unmentioned. The tendencies at the national levels in Europe is clear: Both the far-right and far-left populists have been experiencing growing support. Slovakia’s populist left leader Fico, Austria’s pro-Kremlin Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which might gain considerable success in the upcoming elections,  and the fact that in the majority of EU countries the populist, more radical parties are on the political scene participating in the creation of the political agenda, and in some countries, including Sweden, are included in governing coalitions, shows that the populist agenda has an impact. They have already influenced some topics in EU politics, like migration, and will continue to do so, perhaps becoming even more harmfully radical if center powers find themselves unable to balance them effectively in issues like EU Finances, the EU’s foreign policy and LGBTQI rights, if the risks are not adequately assessed and actions are not taken to weaken their political positions on the EU stages.

Conclusion

As the EU elections show, the high hopes of the populist powers, mostly from the far-right, were not met, as the center managed to maintain power at the EU parliamentary level. The far-right’s significance in the parliament will depend on their ability to work closely, which will be challenging due to their current difference in views regarding the most important topics, among them European security and Ukraine, and due to the still stronger pressure coming from the center. However, at the national level, their success in some countries has been visible, and resulted in leaving countries like France under the spotlight as it caused internal political developments like the scheduling of snap elections. The European-wide tendency of radical, populist powers gaining support is concerning. If this tendency continues unchanged, without considerable challenges from the center powers to weaken their political positions, they will have the potential to gain more influence on European politics. While this will be mostly in a radical way, considering the general rhetoric characterizing these powers, it will undoubtedly be harmful for the EU as a political actor.