Author: Gela Khmaladze

 

In recent years, politicians in Georgia have repeatedly emphasized the role and significance of the Georgian diaspora in the Russian Federation in Georgian-Russian relations. Talks about the number of Georgians living in Russia often take a tone of political speculation. This is particularly evident when certain representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party cite figures ranging from half a million to one million ethnic Georgians living in Russia, doing so without providing any substantiation or sources. Similarly, we deem it to be a manifestation of populism and speculation when it is argued that the Georgian government must necessarily consider the interests of the large Georgian diaspora in Russia when formulating its policies toward the Russian Federation.

It is also worth noting that no comprehensive and objective research has been conducted on the ground to study the Georgian diaspora, which is dispersed across the vast territory of the Russian Federation. Due to the complex political relations with Russia, the Georgian side lacks the opportunity to carry out such research.

It is worth briefly examining the developments within the Georgian diaspora in Russia following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the current state of affairs, and, most importantly, how Russia’s hostile and aggressive policies toward Georgia continue to impact the activities of diaspora organizations.

 

For the Definition of Diaspora

When discussing the concept of diaspora, a common question arises regarding the criteria used to determine whether a group of people living abroad belongs to a diaspora. In the modern era, the increased transparency of international borders, migration flows, and overall human mobility have led to the emergence of ethnic groups in various countries which have acquired specific functions both for their host country and their historical homeland. Today, there is no consensus in the academic field regarding the criteria for determining an individual’s affiliation with a diaspora. Furthermore, there is ongoing debate over whether second and subsequent generations of migrants, who are already fully integrated into their host country, should be considered part of the diaspora. We may agree with the prevailing view that a diaspora consists of groups of people who share a common cultural identity and are characterized by the following key features:

  • They have emigrated from their historical homeland;
  • They maintain social, economic, and cultural ties with their historical homeland;
  • They believe that they can never be fully integrated into the host country;
  • They have a strong conviction that, given favorable circumstances, they will return to their historical homeland.

The Law of Georgia On Compatriots Residing Abroad and Diaspora Organizations, considers any person of Georgian origin, regardless of their ethnic affiliation, as a compatriot living abroad. However, practice shows that Georgian diaspora organizations operating abroad are primarily composed of ethnic Georgians or individuals with a Georgian cultural identity who seek to maintain a connection with Georgia as their historical homeland.

According to the Diaspora Strategy developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, the goal of the Georgian state regarding its diasporas is to “preserve the national identity and cultural uniqueness” of compatriots living abroad, as well as to “ensure the effective operation of diaspora organizations.”

 

How Many Georgians Live in Russia?

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 1989 population census recorded 130,688 ethnic Georgians living in Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a combination of complex political developments and economic difficulties in Georgia during the 1990s led to a significant migration toward the Russian Federation. This was primarily driven by geographical proximity, historical inertia, and the absence of visa barriers.

However, the outflow of Georgian citizens to Russia was significantly restricted from the early 2000s due to several political reasons, specifically:

  • In 2000, Russia unilaterally introduced a strict visa regime for Georgian citizens, making it extremely difficult for them to enter Russian territory;
  • In 2006, Russia imposed an economic embargo on Georgia and carried out ethnically motivated repressions against ethnic Georgians residing in Russia, leading to their mass expulsion;
  • In August 2008, the Russian military invaded Georgia’s sovereign territory, occupying two Georgian regions and later recognizing them as independent states.

After 2010, the growing authoritarian regime in Russia and systematic political repression further discouraged Georgian citizens from seeking stability and better economic conditions in Russia. Notably, in May 2023, when Russia lifted visa restrictions for Georgian citizens, this did not lead to an increase in migration flows toward Russia.

The most objective indicator of the number of Georgians living in Russia comes from official population censuses. According to Russia’s last two censuses, a total of 158,995 people in Russia identified themselves as ethnic Georgians in 2010; this number had declined to 112,765 in 2021. Such a sharp decrease may suggest that most ethnic Georgians in Russia today belong to the second and third generations of migrants, who are already fully integrated into Russian society. Moreover, this indicates that the process of their assimilation into Russian linguistic and national identity has begun.

 

Georgian Diaspora Organizations

In general, the purpose of a diaspora organization is to unite compatriots living in a host country and to give them a platform through which they can preserve their language and culture while maintaining connections with their historical homeland. However, in the Russian Federation, the establishment and functioning of Georgian diaspora organizations have been significantly influenced by the nature of Georgian-Russian bilateral relations, the political climate in Russia, and the ruling regime’s attitude toward Georgia.

During the 1990s, Georgian diaspora organizations operating in Russia, such as the Moscow Georgian Community, Georgian Society in Russia, Iveria Georgian Community, and the Cultural-National Society Unity, were primarily engaged in cultural and artistic activities: they made every effort to distance themselves from the political tensions that existed between Georgia and Russia during that period.

In this regard, the situation changed significantly after 2006, following the deterioration of relations between the two countries. During this period, diaspora organizations such as the Union of Georgians in Russia and the World Congress of Georgian Peoples were established in Russia. Their leaders, Mikheil Khubutia and Alexander Ebralidze, were closely associated with the Russian authorities. In reality, these organizations served their personal interests – ensuring the stability of their businesses in Russia and advancing their political ambitions. Mikheil Khubutia was a member of the ruling United Russia party, and never hesitated to publicly voice Moscow’s official foreign policy line, while Alexander Ebralidze actively attempted to interfere in Georgia’s internal political processes and sought to establish partnerships with ideologically pro-Russian opposition parties.

From late 2012, after the Georgian Dream political coalition came to power in Georgia and the level of confrontation in Georgian-Russian relations decreased, these two diaspora organizations ceased public activity in Russia. Furthermore, in 2015, the Russian court revoked the registration of Mikheil Khubutia’s Union of Georgians in Russia due to multiple violations of Russian legal requirements in the organization’s charter and formal activities.

 

The Situation Today

In its early years in power, the ruling Georgian Dream party did not attempt to leverage the Georgian diaspora in Russia as a factor in the process of normalizing relations with Moscow. At the time, the Georgian government seemed to recognize the ineffectiveness of the diaspora, and was likely aware that the Russian authorities could easily manipulate Georgian diaspora organizations as a tool to influence Georgia’s political course.

In recent years, however, the landscape of diaspora organizations in Russia has shifted. Replacing the old, functionally obsolete diaspora organizations, a new entity called the Georgian National-Cultural Autonomy was established in Russia. In terms of its structure and legal status, this organization today functions more as a Russian public association than a traditional diaspora organization. Over time, its “autonomy” has brought together various previously fragmented and loosely connected Georgian diaspora organizations across major regional cities in Russia, improving coordination and consolidating them under a single leadership structure.

The officially stated objective of the Georgian National-Cultural Autonomy is to “strengthen ties with the historical homeland, Georgia, and promote Georgian culture and traditions in Russian society.” However, since 2021, when businessman David Tsetskhladze, a Russian citizen of Georgian descent, came to the helm of the organization, its activities have taken on a distinctly political tone. Tsetskhladze’s public statements closely align with the agenda of Georgia’s “pro-Russian” political parties. He regularly advocates for simplifying the process for ethnic Georgian citizens of Russia to obtain Georgian citizenship, eliminating visa barriers between Georgia and Russia. He also urges the Georgian government to engage in direct dialogue with Moscow, with the ultimate goal of restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries. Additionally, he claims that Georgia should avoid falling under Western influence to “prevent it from becoming a tool of NATO and EU policies in the region.”

Notably, on October 4, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a presidential decree appointing David Tsetskhladze as a member of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations – a consultative body aimed at “promoting harmony among Russia’s ethnic communities.” This move can be interpreted as an attempt to integrate Georgian diaspora activities into Russia’s domestic political agenda.

An important development occurred in March 2024, when Mamuka Merkviladze, a businessman working in Russia and former Vice President of the Georgian National-Cultural Autonomy, was appointed as head of the Georgian Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Moscow. Previously, this position had always been held by a career diplomat from Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This appointment indicates that the Georgian government may be positioning the Georgian diaspora as a strategic asset in future Georgian-Russian relations.

Considering the authoritarian nature of the Russian regime and the total control exerted by its security services, it is likely that both businesses and diaspora organizations operate under strict surveillance. Consequently, linking Mamuka Merkviladze to Georgia’s diplomatic corps could pose national security risks for Georgia.

Another noteworthy development is the recent emergence of a new “pro-Russian” political party in Georgia, Alliance for Peace. The party’s founder, financier, and international secretary is Mamuka Pipia, a businessman with dual citizenship who resides in Russia and is a member of the Georgian diaspora. Interestingly, Pipia’s growing political activity coincides with the post-election period following the October 26 parliamentary elections in Georgia. Given the electoral defeat of pro-Russian political entities such as Alliance of Patriots and Alt-Info, it is likely that the introduction of a new pro-Kremlin political force has become a priority.

Based on these trends, it is reasonable to assume that the involvement of the Georgian diaspora from Russia in Georgia’s domestic political processes will continue to grow in the near future.

 

Conclusion

In general, the resources of a diaspora and the activities of diaspora organizations can positively influence relations between the host country and the historical homeland only if both states share common interests and maintain mutual cooperation.

Today, as the Russian Federation occupies two regions of Georgia and has violated Georgia’s territorial integrity, while at the same time pursuing a revanchist foreign expansion that is in strategic contradiction with Georgia’s officially declared pro-Western foreign policy course, there will always be a risk that Moscow will use the Georgian diaspora in Russia to exert its desired influence on Georgian society and the Georgian government.

It is also important to emphasize that, under authoritarian rule, all forms of public activity in Russia, including the work of NGOs and diaspora organizations, are strictly controlled by the repressive regime. Moreover, the vast majority of ethnic Georgians living in Russia are citizens of the Russian Federation, which means they have certain civic responsibilities and obligations toward the Russian state. As a result, they can easily fall under the influence of the totalitarian regime, including that of the security services. As such, Moscow will always have leverage to maintain effective control over the Georgian diaspora residing within the country.

It is also interesting to recall the example of Armenia. When Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, immediately after coming to power, attempted to balance Russia’s influence by activating a pro-Western foreign policy course, and following Armenia’s military defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, his political team became the target of harsh criticism from the Union of Armenians in Russia, the largest and most influential Armenian diaspora organization operating in Russia. Additionally, attacks from ethnically Armenian Russian media propagandists on Armenia’s current government took on a regular and orchestrated character.

We can infer that, given the conflict-driven and unpredictable nature of Georgia’s relations with Russia, the activities of the Georgian diaspora in Russia will likely continue to present political risks for the Georgian state in the future.