Author: Nino Macharashvili

 

In 2013, following the introduction of its ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), China began strengthening its commercial ties with the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), expanding investments, political convergence, and active integration. By 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, China had already become a key partner for many MENA countries. While the war in Ukraine did not alter the nature of China-MENA relations, it served to accelerate and deepen the dynamics between them.

In today’s polarized world, most MENA nations are choosing neutrality, unwilling to align with either side in the conflicts. China offers them an alternative.

China’s appeal as a partner is two-fold: Politically, Xi Jinping understands that MENA countries prioritize their own political interests over involvement in distant global conflicts between democracy and authoritarianism; economically, China continues to be the largest global consumer of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Against the backdrop of the Ukraine war and Western involvement, China is positioning itself to shape a new world order.

In this blog, we will explore the goals China pursues in its foreign policy in the MENA region, the strategies it employs, and the tangible results it has achieved thus far.

 

China’s Foreign Policy Goals and Methods in the MENA Region

 

China began its integration into the MENA region in its characteristic style—by developing bilateral relations with each state. Countries like Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became key partners for China in the region, serving as a foundation for the development of new cooperative relationships. Bilateral, business-focused cooperation, free of the obligations typical of alliances, became a hallmark of China’s foreign relations. However, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, promoting the development of multilateralism became especially important for China. In this process, Beijing has expanded its efforts to foster closer integration with MENA by developing several new directions:

  1. Expansion of Blocs– After the war began, China began to “revive” and energize regional alliances, particularly two Eurasian unions: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS.
    Although the SCO has not yet evolved into a military bloc or a security council, it is clear that Xi Jinping has a desire to transform it into something larger. On July 4, 2023, the SCO officially expanded to include Iran, making it the 9th member of the China/Russia-dominated bloc and the first member from the Middle East. Iran’s accession marks a significant milestone in China’s efforts to strengthen its ties with MENA countries, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Qatar also becoming partners of the organization. While the SCO is still primarily a largely informal forum, with limited institutional power and ongoing disagreements among members, it is increasingly becoming China’s foremost effort to create a regional bloc that could form the backbone of Eurasian institutional frameworks.

As for BRICS, the group expanded for the first time in nearly 14 years on January 1, 2024, with the inclusion of Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Following this expansion, Algeria remains the only country among China’s comprehensive strategic partners in the MENA region that is not a member of the bloc. While there was no unanimous agreement on this expansion within BRICS, China succeeded in garnering support from all members, marking a diplomatic victory for Xi Jinping. The growing number of countries wishing to join the bloc further confirms that BRICS remains attractive to countries of the Global South. There is speculation that China is attempting to create an “Eastern European Union” within BRICS. For this purpose, efforts are underway to create a common currency similar to the euro, offer loans with unique terms through the New Development Bank (NDB), and more. Yet transforming BRICS into a fully institutionalized and functional organization is unlikely due to the ideological differences among the members of the bloc.

  1. “New Model of Diplomacy” – Last year, Beijing succeeded in resolving a seven-year conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In March 2023, an official agreement was signed in China between Riyadh and Tehran to restore diplomatic and economic relations. Although negotiations between the two countries had been ongoing for two years, China’s involvement was decisive in the process. Beijing was viewed as a trusted partner by both sides, which facilitated the de-escalation of tensions.

China is also trying to play a mediator’s role in the Gaza conflict. The situation between Israel and Hamas is further complicated by the strained relations between Hamas, the governing authority of the Gaza Strip, and Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. On China’s initiative, on July 23, 2024, a treaty was signed in Beijing between Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, including Fatah. The agreement concerns the joint governance of Gaza after the war, and aims to achieve “national unity.” So far, China’s mediation in the Gaza war has not yielded tangible results, but it is clear that Xi Jinping is not giving up.

“New Model of Diplomacy” is how China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi described Beijing’s new initiative. With this model, China has reminded states that there are other conflicts in the world besides the war in Ukraine; conflicts which also deserve the international community’s attention. It has also highlighted the “inability” of the United States, despite its long history of involvement in the region, to alleviate tensions in the Persian Gulf.

  1. Growth in Military Trade– China has increased its arms sales to the MENA region and, along with Russia, conducted joint military exercises with two prominent leaders in the region: Saudi Arabia and Iran. China has also been promoting joint weapons production. These actions are especially significant, as relations with the United States have hit a dead end, seeing Washington refusing to sell modern weapons to MENA countries. China’s arms sales to states that are subject to international sanctions or embargoes serves to strengthen the principle of non-interference in the region, which is particularly appealing to countries striving for strategic autonomy.
  2. Projection of Soft Power– China has realized that leveraging soft power is crucial for attaining leadership status. During the pandemic, it initiated humanitarian efforts in the MENA region, which continued after the war in Ukraine and gained further momentum during the Gaza conflict. Beijing has also prioritized strengthening people-to-people relations, working to expand tourism, educational initiatives, university cooperation, and exchange programs. These efforts reflect China’s broader strategy to craft a positive image in the region, one that portrays China as a socially responsible power and a trusted, multilateral partner.

It is apparent that China is working in multiple directions to increase its role in the MENA region and fulfill its global ambitions. However, the success of these efforts will largely depend on the positions of the countries in the region and the response of the West, particularly the United States.

 

Results of China’s Foreign Policy in the MENA Region

 

China is trying to present itself as a third pole; distinct from the West but not identical to Russia. This power aims to attract the part of the Global South that has responded to the war in Ukraine with varying degrees of neutrality. However, China’s efforts face opposition from both within the MENA region itself and the United States.

Countries in the MENA region do not have a unified approach toward the future development of relations with China. Broadly, two groups of countries can be identified, based on their positions:  1. Iran and Syria, which, due to attempts by the West to isolate them, fully support China and see partnership with it as an opportunity for political legitimacy and economic growth. However, it is important to note that after the fall of Assad’s regime in Syria, it remains unclear how the new government will shape its policy.  2. Virtually all other countries in the region, which have rejected the logic of needing to align with one specific side and have chosen to maintain historical relations with Washington while continuing profitable partnerships with China. The strategy of most MENA countries is to balance between the two great powers.  While these countries are increasingly integrating into Eurasian alliances and leaning more toward the East, they are not yet ready to fully “abandon” the West. In fact, this situation appears to favor China more than the United States, meaning Washington will need to exert additional effort to solidify its position in the region.

The West is not willing to concede the MENA region to China. This is evident from the decision made at the 2023 G20 summit to create a new trade route. The project, called the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), aims to integrate Asia and Europe, and demonstrates that the West and the developing South are moving toward closer cooperation. In the form of IMEC, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) now faces a real competitor. It is clear that MENA countries are not yet inclined to choose between the two projects, and are attempting to benefit from both.

China’s success in the MENA region will largely depend on the new U.S. president and his administration’s policies. It is interesting to consider what path Donald Trump will choose regarding relations with regional states and managing tensions with Iran. There are several potential scenarios:  1. The “Divide and Conquer” policy, which Trump employed during his previous presidency and which focused on isolating Iran and strengthening alliances with other states;  2. The “Isolationist” approach, which was characteristic of Biden’s administration toward the region;  3. A “Nuanced” approach, which prioritizes diplomatic relations and multilateralism as the most effective means of fostering stability. This approach could allow for Iran’s return to the JCPOA(Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), thereby supporting U.S. interests in the region.

 

Conclusion

 

Regardless of how the war in Ukraine ultimately ends, it is evident that China has already gained from the conflict. For many countries in the Global South, aligning with China has become an appealing solution, offering a balanced political and economic alternative as they navigate the tensions between two sharply divided global powers.

Since 2022, China’s role in the MENA region has grown, owing to Xi Jinping’s accurate assessment of the region’s needs—economic cooperation while maintaining political independence—and the development of an approach aimed at addressing those needs. China has taken further significant steps to integrate itself more deeply into the MENA region: revitalizing and expanding the SCO and BRICS, assuming a mediator’s role in regional conflicts, becoming an importer of military weapons, and utilizing soft power, among other actions. As a result, MENA states have begun to actively “shift east.”

Despite this shift to the East, much of the region, excluding Iran and Syria, maintains neutrality and continues relations with the West to gain bilateral benefits. The future development of China-MENA relations will largely depend on the new U.S. president and his administration’s policies toward the region. While Donald Trump’s plans remain unknown, it is clear that he will have much to learn from China’s approach. Both Trump’s “divide and conquer” strategy and Biden’s “isolationist” approach failed to lead to significant tangible outcomes, making it more likely that the nuanced approach employed by China will also benefit Washington.