Author: Anna Khomasuridze

 

Once heavily dependent on Russian energy, the Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – achieved full independence from Russian electricity and gas on February 8, 2025. This milestone marks a historic shift in their geopolitical positioning. The central question of how small countries can secure energy sovereignty while under pressure from a more powerful neighbour has long been a critical issue for the Baltic states. However, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the region took decisive steps to eliminate this dependency and integrate into the European energy grid. This blog explores the measures taken by the Baltic states to achieve energy independence, the underlying motivations driving these decisions, and the role of energy security in countering Moscow’s hybrid threats.

Steps Toward Energy Independence

The Baltic states have implemented a series of strategic initiatives aimed at reducing dependence on Russian energy sources and strengthening their domestic energy infrastructure. These measures include the development of LNG infrastructure, investments in renewable energy, the expansion of regional energy interconnectors, an immediate cessation of Russian energy imports, and, ultimately, synchronisation with the European electricity grid.

  • Lithuania was the first country to halt Russian gas imports, constructing the Klaipėda LNG terminal in 2014. This infrastructure enabled the diversification of gas supply routes and served as a catalyst for Estonia and Latvia to accelerate their efforts towards securing their own LNG resources.
  • Renewable energy projects are at the core of the Baltic states’ energy security strategy. Lithuania has taken the lead in this area, setting an ambitious goal to transition to 100% renewable electricity by 2050. To achieve this, the country, in collaboration with Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, launched large-scale offshore wind projects and, in 2024, announced a 700 MW offshore wind tender. Additionally, Lithuania’s state-owned energy group Ignitis invested €178 million in Latvia’s solar projects as part of a €700 million regional commitment. Estonia’s Sunly allocated €300 million to develop 1.3 GW of renewable energy capacity. These investments contribute to diversifying energy sources, stabilising power grids, and reducing reliance on fossil fuels.
  • The development of regional energy interconnectors played a critical role in reducing dependence on Russia. Key infrastructure projects such as NordBalt (linking Lithuania to Sweden) and LitPolLink (connecting Lithuania to Poland) enhanced the region’s energy resilience.
  • Following Russia’s invasion in 2022, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania ceased all energy imports from Russia, effectively cutting off one of Moscow’s primary instruments of influence. However, despite stopping Russian electricity and natural gas purchases, their continued connection to the BRELL electricity grid – which links them to Russia and Belarus – left them technically dependent on Moscow. This infrastructural reliance underscored Russia’s persistent energy leverage in the region, despite the Baltic states’ efforts to sever economic ties.
  • On February 8, 2025, a “historic step” was taken towards full European energy integration – all three Baltic states disconnected from the Soviet-era BRELL electricity network and synchronised with the European continental power grid.

 

The Rationale Behind These Actions

Historically, Russia has leveraged energy resources as a geopolitical weapon, exerting economic pressure through supply disruptions and price manipulation. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine served as a wake-up call, reinforcing the risks of dependence on Russian energy. By severing energy ties, the Baltic states aimed to eliminate one of the Kremlin’s critical hybrid warfare tools. Energy independence enhances economic stability, political sovereignty, and security across the region.

  • Protection from price volatility and supply shocks: The construction of Lithuania’s Klaipėda LNG terminal played a pivotal role in reducing reliance on Russian gas, and inspired Estonia and Latvia to invest in alternative LNG infrastructure. These efforts secured diversified gas import routes, shielding the region from external energy coercion.
  • Strengthening national sovereignty and decision-making autonomy: By disconnecting from the BRELL network and integrating into the European energy system, the Baltic states neutralised Moscow’s influence over their energy infrastructure. Lithuania also introduced strict regulatory measures to prevent foreign ownership of strategic energy assets, further reinforcing its energy sovereignty.
  • Mitigating geopolitical risks: Dependence on a hostile power’s energy resources can be exploited for political or economic coercion. For instance, Russia cut off oil supplies to Lithuania in 1992 to exert pressure. In response to such threats, Estonia expanded wind energy projects, while Latvia modernised its natural gas storage facilities to enhance regional supply security. Such actions reduced vulnerability to external energy disruptions and bolstered national security.

 

The Economic Costs of Energy Independence

The Baltic states’ transition to energy independence required substantial investments and strategic initiatives, yielding both immediate security benefits and long-term economic gains.

  • The budget for full integration into the European energy system was largely financed by the European Union, which covered €1.2 billion (75%) of the total cost, while Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia contributed the remaining 25%. This financial support facilitated the synchronisation of the Baltic electricity grids with continental Europe, eliminating their dependence on Russia’s BRELL system. These steps not only enhanced energy security, but also stimulated economic growth, with projections indicating that 2025 would bring about GDP increases of 3.0% in Lithuania, 1.8% in Latvia, and 1.0% in Estonia.
  • Prioritising renewable energy investments has been key to reducing reliance on external energy sources. Lithuania’s Klaipėda LNG terminal, operational since 2014, diversified gas supply routes, lowering energy costs and stabilising the market. Additionally, the synchronisation of the Baltic power grids with the European network in February 2025 strengthened energy security and market integration, leading to more competitive electricity prices. Despite the upfront costs, these strategic moves are expected to yield significant long-term economic benefits.

 

EU and Baltic Leaders on Energy Independence as a Response to Russian Influence

Baltic leaders have consistently emphasised that achieving energy independence would bring both economic and security guarantees.

  • On February 9, 2025, during a ceremonial event in Vilnius marking the synchronisation of the Baltic electricity grids with the European continental grid, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hailed the achievement as a “historic step” towards energy sovereignty, highlighting its strategic significance for regional stability and resilience.
  • Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna underscored the security implications of this transition, stating: “By ending the energy dependence of the Baltic states on Russia, we are leaving the aggressor without the option of using energy as a weapon against us.” This decision reflects a commitment to national security and sovereignty, despite initial economic costs. The European Union played a crucial role in facilitating this integration by providing financial and logistical support, covering 75% of the costs to ensure a smooth transition.
  • Latvian President Edgars Rinkēvičs highlighted the strategic importance of energy infrastructure projects, among them the Klaipėda LNG terminal and Inčukalns underground gas storage, emphasising their role in strengthening the Baltic energy market. These initiatives not only reinforce energy security, but also provide critical backup capacity during periods of low renewable energy production or restricted electricity imports.

These statements and actions reflect the unified stance of Baltic and EU leaders, prioritising long-term security and economic resilience over short-term challenges. At a broader level, energy independence is viewed as a strategic investment in regional sovereignty and stability.

 

The Role of Energy Independence in Countering Hybrid Threats

By eliminating one of Moscow’s primary pillars of hybrid threats, energy security has strengthened broader national defense mechanisms, including mitigating cyber threats, enhancing regional and EU cooperation, and preventing disinformation and economic coercion.

  • Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection: Russian cyberattacks frequently target critical energy infrastructure, including electricity grids and energy supply chains, with the intent of disrupting operations. In response, Estonia has developed advanced cybersecurity protocols, including the government-backed Cyber Defense League, composed of IT professionals tasked with protecting national infrastructure. Lithuania has strengthened its digital security cooperation with the EU and implemented measures aligned with NATO’s cyber defense strategies. Additionally, the integration of Baltic electricity networks with the European grid has reduced the risk of Russia-controlled cyber intrusions, ensuring a more secure and resilient energy system.
  • Strengthened Strategic Positioning in the EU and NATO: Close energy ties with European partners reinforce the Baltic states’ strategic standing within the EU and NATO, contributing to collective security efforts. To this end, the Baltic states have actively participated in the EU’s Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), which promotes coordinated energy policies and infrastructure projects. This cooperation has resulted in significant EU investments in Baltic renewable energy projects, solidifying their role as key players in Europe’s energy security policy.
  • Countering Disinformation and Economic Manipulation: Russia has historically sought to shape public opinion in the Baltic region through propaganda and economic coercion, using Kremlin-controlled media to spread false narratives about energy shortages and price hikes, with the aim of creating political instability. In response, Baltic governments have intensified cooperation with EU institutions to combat disinformation. Independent media organisations and fact-checking initiatives, supported by NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence, have played a crucial role in exposing energy-related misinformation. Alongside EU regulatory frameworks, these efforts have reduced Russia’s ability to manipulate energy tariffs, ensuring greater market transparency and stability. By diversifying energy supply chains and increasing information resilience, the Baltic states have effectively neutralised these challenges.

 

Conclusion

In proactive geopolitical strategy, the Baltic states’ consistent approach towards energy independence stands as a pivotal development. The measures taken in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine underscore the importance of reducing reliance on adversarial energy sources as a matter of national security. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have demonstrated that energy independence is not merely about supply diversification – it is a powerful tool for countering hybrid threats and strengthening national resilience. Their success provides valuable lessons for other countries seeking to enhance energy security amid growing geopolitical tensions.