Author: Teona Akubardia
In 2024, the undemocratically conducted parliamentary elections in Georgia, and Irakli Kobakhidze’s statement on November 28 regarding the suspension of EU accession negotiations until 2028, irreversibly changed the country’s domestic and foreign policy vector, despite its constitutionally defined course. A clear attempt to replace democracy with authoritarianism and a policy of distancing from the West has since emerged.
Below will briefly examine certain aspects of the foreign policy of the Georgian Dream regime, which has transformed into an authoritarian system, and its impact on the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its aspirations for NATO and EU membership. It is important to consider the threats this situation poses to the mentioned interests and to a country whose sovereignty and territorial integrity, under partial occupation by Russia, have so far relied on Western support.
Georgia’s national interests and sovereignty have become the subject of manipulation and disinformation by Bidzina Ivanishvili and his party. Above all, this manipulation serves the interests of the country’s informal ruler and the honorary chairman of the party. This is evident in the narrative of protecting sovereignty, used as a means to justify isolation from the West – an approach that echoes Surkov’s concept of “sovereign democracy.” In Putin’s Russia, this very concept led to the complete dismantling of democratic institutions and the destruction of fundamental human rights.
What are the country’s declared national interests and why and how have they been unilaterally changed? Beyond the constitution, which mandates the democratic development of the country and the obligation to pursue NATO and EU membership, national interests are also defined by law and should be outlined in the country’s fundamental conceptual documents. However, due to the lack of political will, the National Security Concept has not been updated since 2011, nor has there been an update to the parliamentary resolution on foreign policy, which, according to the Constitution, should define the country’s foreign policy priorities. Despite the fact that the legitimacy of the 11th Convocation of Parliament is not recognized either domestically or by the West, Bidzina Ivanishvili’s party broke its own tradition, upheld by the previous three parliaments, by failing to update the foreign policy resolution in the newly formed illegitimate parliament. This provides additional clarity on why other strategic documents have not been updated: the informal ruler aims to determine foreign policy unilaterally, disregarding national interests and without even the formal involvement of state institutions. Such an informally shaped foreign policy is in direct contradiction to the country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and aspirations for NATO and EU membership.
The Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Georgia
The de-occupation of Georgia through peaceful means, and with the support of the international community, and the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity are recognized as priority interests in the 2020 Foreign Policy Resolution of the Parliament. Additionally, the 2021 Parliamentary Resolution on De-occupation and the Peaceful Resolution of the Russian-Georgian Conflict, as well as the Government Program, mandated the executive branch to “develop a State Strategy of Georgia for De-occupation and the Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict,” along with a strategy to counter hybrid threats. However, this commitment was entirely removed from the 2024 Government Program. Since the launch of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the Kremlin has intensified its annexation efforts in Georgia’s occupied territories. This is evident in several actions, including the illegal transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House and the illegal leasing of Sokhumi Airport to Moscow for 49 years, the decision to deploy the Russian Naval Fleet at the Ochamchire port in occupied Abkhazia, and the resumption of direct flights between Russia and Sokhumi. Beyond directly undermining Georgia’s sovereignty, these developments pose additional challenges not only for Georgia but also for the security of the wider Black Sea and Europe as a whole. Furthermore, the so-called investment agreement and the issue of apart-hotels represent new forms of economic and demographic annexation of Abkhazia by Russia.
Throughout this process, the ruling party consistently refused to defend the country’s sovereignty, even at the level of public statements by the Mistry of foreign affairs, nor did it attempt to mobilize public support from Western partners. Instead, anti-Western propaganda and the portrayal of the West as an enemy became the central pillars of Bidzina Ivanishvili’s domestic and foreign policy, as he seeks to hold on to power.
Equally significant has been the government’s neglect of its responsibility to protect the lives and security of citizens near the occupation line. This was exemplified by the killing of Tamaz Ginturi by Russian occupier forces in the village of Kirbali, and the government’s complete inaction in response. The authorities formally refused to include the names of Ginturi’s killers on the Tatunashvili-Otkhozoria international sanctions list (a stark contrast to previous cases where perpetrators had always been identified). This refusal, along with the failure to investigate or even determine the identities of those responsible, was not merely a sign of inaction, but a clear indication of the government’s willingness to compromise the country’s sovereignty rather than defend it.
It is also significant that, since June 2024, during the Geneva International Discussions, Russia has made statements opposing US and NATO military trainings and assistance provided through the European Peace Facility. The Kremlin’s goal in these discussions was to undermine the role of the European Union as an “honest broker.” Following Bidzina Ivanishvili’s public anti-Western statements and his party’s undemocratic actions, NATO’s multinational military exercises were halted in 2024, and the European Peace Facility ceased its support for Georgia’s defense forces. With Georgia increasingly at odds with the EU, the EU’s role as an “honest broker” has also become uncertain. Remaining without partners other than the Russian occupier forces aligns with the Kremlin’s objectives.
Despite the rigged elections, the ruling party failed to secure the constitutional majority it sought during its pre-election campaign, which was essential for removing NATO and EU membership from the country’s constitution. Russia’s foreign ministry expressed a clear stance on this issue during the November GID, shortly after the elections. In its statement, the Kremlin openly used Bidzina Ivanishvili’s propaganda of shifting the blame for the war onto Georgia, offering one-sided apologies, and claiming the West seeks to open a second front as a means of exerting additional pressure on official Tbilisi to recognize the so-called independence of the occupied regions. Additionally, for the first time in the Geneva format, Russia openly expressed dissatisfaction with the constitutional provision about Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic course, which cannot be dismissed as a mere coincidence. The newly created temporary investigative commission in the illegitimate parliament to probe the August 2008 war serves to assist Ivanishvili’s attempt to shift the blame for the war onto Georgia and the West, thereby minimizing/eliminating Russia’s role as an aggressor. In the future, this situation could serve as a pretext for the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia, which were severed as a result of the war.
Another key interest that has been undermined by the actions of Ivanishvili’s government in this process is the policy of non-recognition. Yet another missed opportunity in this regard is the change of government in Syria and the subsequent expulsion of Russia from the country. Despite the current circumstances, Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not reached out to strategic partners to work with Syria’s new leadership on revoking the so-called recognition of the occupied regions’ “independence.” Engaging with Turkey, which, like other neighbors in the region, recognized the results of the Georgian Dream elections, would likely have been the most effective approach in this situation, given Ankara’s influence in Syria. However, inaction on this issue again testifies to the conflict of the Ivanishvili regime with Georgia’s sovereignty, regardless of whether it is doing so under the influence and dictates of the Kremlin, or so as to consolidate its own power.
The informal policies and actions of Georgian Dream pose additional threats to the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, further complicating Georgia’s ability to confront Russia’s interests and future actions, even if there were a willingness to do so, especially in a one-on-one situation with Russia. As the country’s shift in sovereign choice coincides with Russia’s interests, it is inevitable that Russia will demand further concessions from Georgia in various forms.
NATO and EU Membership
Georgian Dream dealt a significant blow to Georgia’s national interest of joining the EU and NATO as early as 2023, with the adoption of the so-called “Russian law.” The fact that EU membership is no longer a priority for the regime was confirmed by Irakli Kobakhidze’s statement on November 28. Additionally, the country’s shift from democracy toward authoritarianism has become increasingly evident. As a result of this policy, financial programs and direct governmental and parliamentary-level contacts with EU and NATO member states have been suspended, while strategic partnerships with the US and the UK have been severed. This not only negatively impacts Georgia’s sovereignty and NATO membership prospects, but also significantly undermines the country’s defense capabilities, which had previously relied on the support of NATO and EU partners. Furthermore, Georgian Dream’s recent decision to withdraw from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in response to the adoption of a critical resolution against it now puts Georgia’s very membership in the Council of Europe at risk.
Expected Threats: Participation in the 3+3 Format and the Restoration of the Abkhazian Railway
In the academic sphere, amid Georgia’s distancing/isolation from the West, there is an emerging opinion characterizing Bidzina Ivanishvili’s foreign policy as an “Eastern Express.” However, it is likely that, as a result of Georgia’s shift in foreign policy, revisionist Russia will once again seek to derive the greatest benefit in the region from Ivanishvili’s gambit. Irakli Kobakhidze’s official visits abroad so far this year have clearly demonstrated a trend in which Georgia is increasingly being positioned as an object rather than a subject of foreign policy; a country that no longer acts, and cannot act, based on its own interests.
Given the current circumstances, it is likely that Bidzina Ivanishvili will seek to integrate the country into an alternative format to the European Union, while securing additional financial benefits in the context of Georgia’s isolation from the West. The most realistic path for this is to assume the place left open for Georgia in the 3+3 format.
Established in 2021, the 3+3, created in collaboration with Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, also includes the governments of two Western-sanctioned states – Russia and Iran. Until now, despite Moscow’s active efforts, Georgia had refrained from joining this format, primarily due to Russia’s occupation of two of its regions. While the framework has yielded no tangible results since its inception, various emerging security factors must be considered. These include Russia’s interests in controlling existing and future transport corridors in alignment with its strategic goals, its expanding military and economic influence in the South Caucasus, and the necessity of subordinating Georgia’s territory and sovereignty to these objectives. The interests of Russia’s military strategic partner Iran in this format are equally significant. Iran’s Foreign Minister explicitly articulated Tehran’s stance on April 10, 2024, stating that “the South Caucasus should not become an arena for geopolitical competition among non-regional powers,” making clear Iran’s intention to push the West out of the region. Additionally, we must not forget the fact that Irakli Kobakhidze visited Tehran twice in 2024, a move clearly intended as a demonstration to the West.
If Georgia ultimately joins the format, it would open the door for restoring the railway connection with Russia through Abkhazia – an idea that Bidzina Ivanishvili first discussed as early as 2012. This prospect becomes even more realistic given that the railway from Russia to the Ochamchire port has already been restored, leaving only a short section to be connected with the rest of Georgia. Such a development would further undermine Georgia’s already limited sovereignty.
Conclusion
Given the volatile security situation both internationally and regionally, Georgia must align its actions with its national interests, focusing on reducing security risks while advancing these interests and capitalizing on strategic opportunities. This can only be achieved by prioritizing national interests over personal and party agendas; otherwise, the challenge of addressing current and emerging threats will become unavoidable.
