Author: Mamuka Komakhia

 

The year 2024 concluded with a political crisis in Russian-occupied Abkhazia, culminating in the resignation of the de facto president, Aslan Bzhania. It marks yet another instance where the “president” of the occupied region was forced to step down before completing his term. Bzhania, who endeavored to meet Russia’s demands, was compelled to resign months before the end of his tenure following widespread opposition and public protests. The region will hold new “presidential elections” on February 15. Whoever emerges victorious will face a difficult dilemma: the new “president,” regardless of who it is, will inevitably be tasked with meeting Russia’s demands, something Bzhania sacrificed his political career for in an attempt to achieve. Failing to do so could lead to a further hardening of Moscow’s policies toward Sokhumi.

The Precedents of Presidential Resignations

“Presidential” resignations in occupied Abkhazia have become something of a pattern, with the latest marking the third instance of an early departure since 2014. The first “president” was Alexander Ankvab, forced to resign prematurely, paving the way for Raul Khajimba. However, in 2020, Khajimba himself faced resignation, and Ankvab’s team exacted their revenge by regaining power – Aslan Bzhania assumed the presidency, and Ankvab became the “prime minister.” In 2024, Bzhania stepped down in the wake of a political crisis. One of the main figures opposing the Bzhania-Ankvab team was Adgur Ardzinba, a former member of Khajimba’s team. Now, Ardzinba is emerging as one of the key candidates for the upcoming “presidential election.”

The Culmination of the Political Crisis, and the Russian Sanctions

The political crisis in Abkhazia has been steadily escalating over the past few years, driven by a number of issues that spark considerable unrest among the opposition and parts of the population. Key points of contention included the so-called draft laws on foreign agents and apartments, as well as the ratification of an investment agreement with Russia. Despite the de facto government’s commitment to resolving these issues at Russia’s behest, attempts to do so have been met with overwhelming resistance, leaving these matters unresolved.

The so-called draft law on foreign agents, which is currently on hold, forms part of Russia’s broader strategy to exert control over its sphere of influence. The law is aimed at diminishing the influence of “the collective West” and curtailing the activities of civil society and international organizations. Moscow views the West as an adversary and seeks to impose the same stance on occupied Abkhazia. However, significant internal resistance exists, as international organizations have been instrumental in implementing crucial projects in the region, helping to address numerous socio-economic challenges.

The political crisis was deepened by the so-called apartment law, which was preceded by the transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House to Russia. The population summoned “deputies” to the “electoral” districts, who were publicly forced to make statements against the “law.” Opponents of the “law” argued that its adoption would allow wealthy Russian citizens to acquire real estate in Abkhazia, which would ultimately alter the demographic picture to the detriment of the ethnic Abkhaz, weakening their “sovereignty over Abkhazian land.”

The culmination of the political crisis was the attempt to ratify the so-called investment agreement, leading to dissatisfied politicians and citizens storming the “government buildings” and forcing Bzhania to resign. Opponents of the “agreement” argued that its ratification would grant Russian oligarchs numerous privileges that would negatively impact on local businesses and the income of the population.

The so-called investment issue was the final straw for Russia, which had tolerated the “strategic ally’s” “insubordination” for far too long. Until then, Russia had held back from taking harsh actions and had shown “understanding” towards the Abkhaz resistance. In an effort to expedite the resolution of the issue, Moscow effectively imposed sanctions on occupied Abkhazia: it partially cut off funding, which caused problems with salary payments, and refused to assist Sokhumi to overcome the energy crisis. Under Kremlin pressure, Bzhania attempted to ratify the so-called investment agreement on November 15, but after significant opposition, he was forced to resign on November 19 and to call for early “presidential elections.”

The “Presidential” Candidates

The illegitimate presidential “elections” will take place on February 15. According to the so-called Central Election Commission, five candidates will participate in the “elections.” Initially, there were rumors that Bzhania would also try his luck, but it seems that his candidacy was rejected in Moscow and he was excluded from the political race at an early stage. The “presidential” candidates are:

Badra Gumba (43 years old) – From 2020, during Bzhania’s “presidency,” Gumba served as “vice president,” and during Alexander Ankvab’s “presidency,” he was the “minister of culture” (2011-2014). Since November 19, 2024, following Bzhania’s departure, Gumba has been performing the duties of the “president.” Bzhania supports Gumba, while Ankvab is leading his “election” campaign. Administrative resources have been mobilized in Gumba’s favor, as Bzhania’s de facto government members will retain their positions until the election of a new “president.”

Adgur Ardzinba (43) – During Raul Khajimba’s “presidency,” he was the “minister of economy” and “vice prime minister” (2015-2020). Currently, he is the leader of the opposition People’s Movement of Abkhazia. Since 2020, he has been one of Bzhania’s main opponents. During the 2024 political crisis, he was one of the lead figures among the three opposition leaders. Ardzinba participated in the 2020 “elections,” where he was defeated by Bzhania. Interestingly, in 2019, he took qualification enhancement courses at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Robert Arshba (50) – Former head of the so-called Audit Chamber.

Oleg Bartsits (57) – Former representative of Abkhazia’s so-called Chamber of Commerce in Russia.

Adgur Khurkhumal (42) – Chairman of the Board of Directors of the “Black Sea Development Bank.” Little is known about him.

Of these five candidates, only Arshba participated in the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia, which is a significant factor in Abkhazian politics. It is highly likely that the new “president” will be someone who did not participate in the war, signaling the arrival of a new generation in the politics of the occupied region.

Who is Russia’s Favorite?

The “pre-election” campaign in occupied Abkhazia began on January 10. It is evident that the Kremlin’s favorite is Badra Gunba, whom Russia is providing with maximum support, while his opponents are labeled as anti-Russian forces in the Russian media. Adgur Ardzinba has even been accused of having pro-Turkish sentiments, while the main participants in the 2024 political crisis, “deputy” Kan Kvarchia and Abkhazia’s “hero” Levan Mikaa, had their Russian citizenship revoked. Ardzinba, alongside these figures, was part of the opposition triumvirate that opposed Bzhania. Russian media has even referred to them as “putschists,” indicating Russia’s stance towards Ardzinba and his allies.

It is evident that Russian political technologists are actively involved in the “pre-election” process. For the first time in the history of the occupied region, a sociological survey was conducted on the “elections.” According to the survey, in the upcoming “presidential elections,” Badra Gunba has the support of 32% of respondents, Adgur Ardzinba – 15%, Oleg Bartsits – 7%, Robert Arshba – 5%, and Adgur Khurkhumal – 2%.

This sociological survey was conducted for the first time in Abkhazia, and caused something of a scandal. Initially, it was unclear who was conducting the survey. According to the de facto government, the telephone survey, which aimed to study the political views of the population before the “elections,” was not coordinated with the so-called State Statistics Committee. It was later revealed that the survey was conducted by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM). The results of the survey raised suspicions about the Kremlin’s favoritism toward Gunba. Based on Russian political-technological traditions, the publication of the survey results in the occupied region seeks to influence the “voters’” decisions.

A January 31-February 1 visit to Abkhaia by Sergey Kiriyenko (born in Sokhumi), the Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration overseeing the direction of the Georgian occupied regions, was an open display of support for Gunba. During his visit, Kiriyenko met with representatives of the de facto government, as well as heads of various educational and cultural institutions. He also visited Sokhumi Airport, where he participated in a working meeting attended by Gunba. Gunba serves as the head of the coordination headquarters for the reconstruction and construction of the airport.

Interestingly, Kiriyenko was accompanied by Akhra Avidzba, a participant in Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, the commander of the Pyatnashka International Brigade and a fighter hailed as a “hero” by Russian propaganda. Avidzba openly supported Gunba, despite his previous conflicts with Bzhania.

Although Kiriyenko stated at the end of his visit that Russia would “respect any choice made by the Abkhaz people,” it is evident where the sympathies of the Kremlin’s influential figure lie.

A clear sign of the Kremlin’s open support for Gunba was his visit to Moscow and high-level meetings, including with Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, Finance Minister Anton Siluanov, Health Minister Mikhail Murashko, and Deputy Energy Minister Evgeny Grabchak. On February 6, Gunba even met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. The Russian Foreign Ministry referred to Gunba as a “prominent political figure of the Republic of Abkhazia.”

Gunba was also the first passenger on the plane that landed at the restored Sokhumi Airport on February 7. He returned from Moscow with specific decisions, announcing that Moscow had agreed to revise the so-called investment agreement and adopt a new one that would consider the interests of both sides. Positive resolutions were also reached regarding electricity supply and the salaries of “budgetary” organization employees. Immediately following his meeting with the Russian finance minister, RUB 340 million were transferred to Abkhazia for pensions and salaries. Additionally, electricity supply issues were promptly resolved.

 

What Are the Chances, and What Should We Expect?

 

This is not the first time Russia has openly supported a specific “presidential” candidate. However, the history of “presidential elections” in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region shows that Kremlin-backed candidates do not always win. And when the Kremlin’s candidate loses, a political crisis nearly always follows in these regions.

In the current scenario, the two leading contenders are Badra Gunba and Adgur Ardzinba. While Gunba enjoys Kremlin support, there is a strong likelihood that he will fall short of securing an outright victory in the first round, making a runoff inevitable.

The Kremlin’s extensive support for Badra Gunba, combined with the “black PR” campaign against Adgur Ardzinba, sends a clear message to “voters” in occupied Abkhazia: Russian assistance is guaranteed only if Gunba wins. While Moscow’s active interference may ultimately pave the way for his victory, it will not avert an impending political crisis.