Author: Aleksandre Kvakadze
On the 8th of August 2023, a significant official delegation embarked on a noteworthy visit to Mariupol, the Ukrainian city that fell under Russian occupation in 2022. The Mayor of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, Khas-Magomed Kadyrov, along with the de facto leader of Mariupol’s administration, Oleg Morgun, joined forces to formalize a twinning agreement between the two cities. Notably, the head of the Chechen republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, in his capacity, took to his social media platform to express his thoughts on this event, affirming that ‘this decision will fortify our collaboration across essential domains and bring about a positive transformation in vital, socially significant directions.’ The commemorative ceremony also saw the unveiling of memorials dedicated to the valiant heroes of World War II. But what truly lies behind Ramzan Kadyrov’s keen interest in Mariupol?
Amidst the harrowing siege of Mariupol, Ramzan Kadyrov displayed an unexpected surge of enthusiasm. A multitude of Chechen units, staunchly aligned with Russia, played a role in the fierce Mariupol battle. While debates surrounding the extent of their direct engagement in the conflict persisted, these Chechen units released numerous videos documenting their presence within the city. It was only after the surrender of the defenders of Azovstal and the full-scale occupation of the city that Kadyrov noticeably heightened his involvement in post-conflict affairs.
According to reports, Alash Dadashov, an associate of Kadyrov and co-owner of the illustrious Illich Iron and Steel Works, has surfaced as a notable figure in the Mariupol landscape. Dadashov, who also holds ownership of the Moscow-based MMA club ‘Akhmat,’ has gone a step further by registering multiple enterprises within Mariupol. Even with the available, albeit scarce, information on Chechen business ventures in Mariupol, it undeniably underscores Kadyrov’s vested interests in the region.
Kadyrov’s burgeoning interest in Mariupol can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, as the leader of landlocked Chechnya, he has long sought access to the sea. His previous attempts to extend his influence into Dagestan and secure positions within Caspian Sea ports proved unsuccessful. Similarly, the fiercely competitive landscape among Russia’s other Black and Caspian Sea ports, including Novorosiysk, Astrakhan, and even the annexed Crimea, presented formidable obstacles to Kadyrov’s aspirations for establishing a meaningful presence. In contrast, the desolation and ruination that befell Mariupol left it devoid of substantial competition, providing Kadyrov with a unique opportunity to exert influence in a relatively uncompetitive environment. Secondly, financial interests loom large in this equation. While much of Mariupol’s industrial sites lay in ruins following the ravages of active warfare, the Russian government has set its sights on initiating a comprehensive reconstruction program within the occupied city. This ambitious endeavour is poised to channel significant budgetary transfers into a myriad of infrastructural projects. For Kadyrov and his associates, this presents a singular and lucrative opportunity to secure an additional stream of income. They stand poised to participate in tenders related to these reconstruction projects, potentially entangling themselves in a web of corruption schemes along the way.
It is also worth considering the potential motivation of certain militants affiliated with Kadyrov-linked units, who may be eyeing the opportunity to claim abandoned properties. As reported by Russian media, the population of this once-thriving city, which stood at around half a million, has dwindled to around fifty per cent that number since its annexation. This significant demographic shift has left a substantial number of residences unattended. It is unlikely that certain categories of refugees, particularly those loyal to the Ukrainian government, will return to the city while it remains under Russian occupation. Consequently, a significant window of opportunity emerges, one that could see not only high-ranking Kadyrov commanders, but also rank-and-file members rewarded with apartments.
Extending certain privileges to Kadyrov within the Mariupol context can be seen as a gesture of gratitude for his unwavering loyalty to President Putin. Beyond the involvement of Kadyrov-linked units in the Ukrainian campaign, and his unequivocal political support for Putin’s efforts in Ukraine, Kadyrov garnered additional respect from Putin during an unsuccessful coup attempt by the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin. During this critical juncture, Kadyrov actively stood by Putin, expressing his readiness to confront the Wagner Group if necessary.
Yet, not everyone welcomes Kadyrov’s presence in Mariupol. Foremost among his opponents are the de facto officials of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), to which Mariupol was transferred following its annexation. Even during the heat of combat in Mariupol, high-ranking DNR-linked field commanders voiced concerns about the limited involvement of Chechen forces in the conflict. Moreover, reports have emerged of sporadic skirmishes between Russian and Chechen units stationed in Mariupol. However, on the whole, it appears unlikely that these challenges will pose significant obstacles for Kadyrov, who continues to enjoy unwavering support from Putin.
In conclusion, the reinforcement of Kadyrov’s position in occupied Mariupol underscores his distinct role within Putin’s power structure. In the event of an unsuccessful Ukrainian counteroffensive and a protracted status quo, Kadyrov stands poised to augment his financial and political influence. However, it is improbable that, once he has received his reward, we will witness the active participation of Chechen units in Russia’s defensive or offensive military operations within Ukraine.
