Author: David Batashvili, Research Fellow at Rondeli foundation

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 15 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of March 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region and Objective 21: Alignment with Iran

  • Israeli sources reported on 2 March that Russian military helicopters based in Syria continued to conduct intelligence missions targeting Israeli armed forces in the area of Israeli-Syrian border. Such missions were also reported in the January 2024 issue of the Russian Geostrategy Monitor.

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • Fierce fighting was taking place in the Russo-Ukrainian War during March 2024, with Russians attacking on many sections of front, and slowly advancing on the frontlines west of the previously captured towns of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
  • In late March 2024, European intelligence agencies dismantled a Russian propaganda network operating in Europe and trying to undermine European support for Ukraine’s resistance against the Russian invasion. The network had been centered on the Voice of Europe website, its activities including payments made to politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Hungary, including members of the European Parliament.

 

Objective 11: Achieving decisive influence over Moldova

  • On 1 March, Russian foreign minister Lavrov attacked the legitimacy of Moldova’s democratic government, referring to it as a “regime established in [the Moldovan capital] Chisinau which follows step by step the Kyiv one” and “the Romanian leadership in Chisinau.”
  • On 5 March, the head of Moldova’s intelligence said Russia intended to conduct a hybrid attack against Moldova “by backing pro-Russian protests, fomenting violence and backing the breakaway region of Transnistria” in order to disrupt Moldovan presidential election and EU integration referendum set to be held in 2024.

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • On 6 March, Russia’s satellite regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger announced the setting up of their joint security force.
  • On 16 March, Russia’s satellite regime in Niger announced it was ending the agreement with the US allowing the presence of American troops in the country.
  • Russia’s ambassador in the Central African Republic said the two countries’ defense ministries were in the process of choosing the location for a Russian military base.
  • Russia delivered 25,000 tonnes of grain in aid to Zimbabwe on 20 March.

 

Objective 20: Alignment with China and Objective 21: Alignment with Iran

  • In mid-March, Russia conducted a joint naval exercise with China and Iran in the Gulf of Oman. More than 20 ships from the three powers’ navies participated.