

Archil Chachkhiani

1920 "WE FACE A FATAL THREAT..."



Analyzing the military-political situation in the First Republic of Georgia at the end of 1920 and portraying its certain developments is one of the most pressing issues in Georgia's contemporary history. The military-political relations between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and Bolshevik Russia as well as the results stemming from it are exceptionally interesting. In this context, several questions ought to be answered – did the Georgian state possess information about the possible military campaign by Bolshevik Russia? How adequately did the Georgian government and military circles perceive the degree of foreign threats, and was the country preparing for the impending war with Bolshevik Russia?

Georgian historiography is permeated with the opinion that the full-scale military intervention launched by the Bolsheviks in the lower part of the Borchalo uyezd on the morning of February 12, 1921, was a surprise to the Georgian state. As if the identity of the enemy, the composition and number of its armed forces, the primary and auxiliary directions of the strike, the plans of combat operations, etc., had not been fully identified. We find such opinions mainly in memoir literature (G. Kvinitadze, G. Mazniashvili, Sh. Maghlakelidze, Ak. Kvitaishvili, Al. Chkheidze, V. Tevzadze, R. Gabashvili, and others). Such an approach to the issue is somewhat understandable, as the aforementioned authors did not have access to the top secret military documents designed to strengthen the state's defense capabilities. Yet, memoir literature cannot be attributed as an

infallible first source. It is also indisputable that in any type of memoir, both significant and minor inaccuracies can be made, intentionally or inadvertently.

It is noteworthy that Soviet historiography deliberately followed the ideological line of presenting the foreign policy direction of the Bolsheviks and falsifying history.

Such narratives successfully circulated for decades in hundreds of works and books by dozens of Soviet authors. This line of Soviet ideology was founded by Isaak Izrailevich Mints, a prominent representative of the "Red Professorship" – a historian, academician, hero of socialist labor, two-time winner of the Stalin Prize and Lenin Prize, one of the founding members of the Soviet Historiographical School, and one of the apologists for Soviet ideology. His work *"Победа советской власти в Закавказье"* (*Victory of the Soviet Government in the Transcaucasia*), became a classic example and guidebook for later representatives of the Soviet School of History. The very first sentence of the introductory part of this work reads: "The events surrounding the victory of the Soviet government in the Caucasus went down in the annals of history of the Great October Socialist Revolution, showing a model for solving the world's social problems: overthrowing a government of exploiters, establishing a dictatorship of



**Isaak Mints
(1896 – 1991)**

the proletariat, transformation of the private bourgeois landownership into public, socialist property, a fair resolution of the agrarian question in favor of the peasants, liberation of the subordinate peoples from colonial and national oppression, and the creation of political and economic preconditions for the reconstruction of socialism. The struggle of the working people of Transcaucasia in the socialist revolution is an organic link in the revolutionary process that has shaped the social worldview of our country and, as V. I. Lenin noted, opened a new era in world history..."¹

In the "Essays on the History of Georgia," we read: "The

communist newspaper *Sukhumskaya Pravda* unleashed a ruthless and exposing struggle against saboteurs, speculators, and bourgeois-nationalists. At the same time, the newspaper called upon the masses for international solidarity to solidify the Soviet power, systematically covering the measures taken by the RSFSR government to strengthen the socialist state and to establish peace among the peoples of the world; it exposed the Transcaucasian counter-revolutionary governments and covered the powerful revolutionary struggle for Soviet power waged by the working-class masses of the Caucasus under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party."²

Even Arnold Borisovich Kadyshev, a doctor of history, a colonel, one of the conscientious scholars of military history, clearly could not escape the influence and pressure of Soviet ideology. In his book *"Интервенция и гражданская война в Закавказье"* (*Intervention and Civil War in the Caucasus*), Kadyshev writes: "The Soviet government, faithful to its peace-loving policy, did not miss the slightest opportunity to resolve the differences with Georgia, as with other Transcaucasian republics, by peaceful means ..."³



The historical reality is that shortly after the October coup, which propelled the Bolsheviks to the summit of the Russian central government, Lenin and his associates ceased their short-lived democratic prelude, resorting to an active military campaign that began the lengthy and bloody process of ideological expansion and proletarian neocolonialism by force throughout the former Tsarist Empire. They also employed a weighty argument in the matter – the "Worker-Peasant Red



The gravestone of Arnold Kadyshev at Novodevich cemetery in Moscow (1897 – 1986)

Army", the RKKА (Рабоче-крестьянская Красная армия), and ignited the fire of the "world proletarian revolution" in Eastern Europe.

Due to the difficult international situation, the Georgian state began to take care of the settlement of Russian-Georgian relations immediately after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation and the restoration of Georgia's



May 7, 1920 Moscow Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

state independence. The first diplomatic mission of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was sent to Moscow on June 11, 1918, but to no avail.

Ostensibly, Russian-Georgian military-political relations were normalized only two years later, in the spring of 1920, when a treaty was signed in Moscow on May 7, 1920, whereby the Kremlin recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Georgian state. In the field of world politics, this was the first time that a metropolis recognized the independence of part of its territories before other countries would do so.⁴

We will not go into a point-by-point discussion of the treaty of May 7, 1920, as much research has been done on these issues. We will discuss only on one of the articles, which was given in the secret appendix of the treaty:

"Georgia accepts the responsibility to recognize the right of local communist organizations to exist and operate freely, in particular the right to freedom of assembly and freedom of publication (including printing facilities).

"Repressions cannot be exercised under any circumstances, neither judicial nor administrative, neither against individuals nor organizations, if it concerns public propaganda and agitation in favor of the Communist program, as well as their actions, which are based on the Communist program."⁵

By the treaty of May 7, 1920, Soviet Russia recognized the Democratic Republic of Georgia, while in return it achieved the legalization of Bolshevik activities operating in Georgia. It was precisely this clause of the agreement that paved the way for unrestricted anti-state actions by the Bolsheviks and a thousand other scandals against the foundations of the Georgia state. Soon, an official 300-member representation of the Russian

Federation was opened in Tbilisi, headed by Sergei Kostrikov-Kirov,⁶ a close friend and comrade of Sergo Orjonikidze, a member of the Military-Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front. In fact, an intelligence residence of the Kremlin and the Bolsheviks' Caucasus Bureau was established in Georgia.

In a special report, the "Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia," published by the United States House of Representatives in 1955, we read: "[Kirov] immediately established close contacts with the leaders of the Georgian Communist Party and began setting up networks to explode the young republic from within. At his disposal were unlimited finances, and in his service a large number of experienced agitators, provocateurs, and agents. Communist cells and groups were organized, and the 'fifth column' was prepared. At the same time, in direct violation of Article VI of the Peace Treaty, the 'Government of Georgia' was established outside the country."⁷ Here, under the "Government of Georgia" is meant the "Revkom" – the "Revolutionary Committee" created by the Bolsheviks, that is the future provisional government of the country to be conquered. Usually, along with its military supplies, the Russian occupation army also carries with it the government intended for the conquered country, whose task is to legalize and justify any Russian action.⁸ This is a historically proven fact."

Georgia, as a legal entity committed to diplomatic and international obligations, obediently complied with the terms of the May 7th agreement.

The following resolution was adopted at the Government Meeting already on May 11 (Protocol N 2041):

- 1. The report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be taken into account and the Minister of the Interior should immediately implement Article 109 of the Treaty (on the release of the Bolsheviks from prison, except those charged with a criminal offense);*
- 2. The Finance and Supply ministers will be tasked with setting up an economic and trade commission to be sent to Russia;*
- 3. The Border Commission shall be composed by the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Defense, chaired by the latter."⁹*

The resolution was signed by the Chairman of the Government of Georgia, Noe Jordania.


The situation changed in the fall of 1920. The war waged against Poland to export the "World Proletarian Revolution" ended in a crushing defeat of the Russian Bolsheviks. A treaty of cessation of hostilities was signed in Riga on October 12, 1920. This opened the way for the Bolsheviks to further escalate their activities against Georgia. Internal and external intrigues were concocted against Georgia, new forces and means were mobilized in Transcaucasia, and new strategies of military intervention were developed. A general plan for Bolshevik military intervention was obtained by the Georgian intelligence services. Incidentally, the very same Kirov was the head of the Soviet delegation during the Riga negotiations. After the Riga agreement, the Bolsheviks faced no obstacles for further escalation of their actions against Georgia. Georgia began to be surrounded by external and internal intrigues in addition to new forces and tools in Transcaucasia, newly developed strategies of military intervention. The Georgian intelligence services intercepted the Bolshevik general plan of a military intervention.¹⁰

In his secret report of December 12, 1920, the Commander of the 11th Red Army, Anatoly Hecker,¹¹ briefed the Chairman of the Military-Revolutionary Council of the Caucasus Front, Sergo Orjonikidze, on the general operational situation and the tasks facing the Army in the context of Georgian intervention.

The report stressed the fact that "without a prior settlement with the Turks, launching military operations against Georgia would be dangerous."¹²

As for Turkey, the new resistance movement there, Kemalism, and Bolshevik-Kemalist relations, is an issue beyond our subject matter; and as such, we will not discuss it this time. Let us say only that in the spring of 1919, a military-political alliance was formed between the Russian Bolsheviks and the Turkish Kemalists to fight the so called "world imperialism" and Entente states.

In the spring of 1920, this newly formed alliance began the bloody process of redistribution of the Transcaucasian territories.



"Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia" – a special report of the US House of Representatives issued in 1955

With the support of Turkish Kemalists, the Russian Bolsheviks occupied Baku and Azerbaijan in late April 1920, and at the end of November of the same year, Russian-Turkish Bolshevik-Kemalist military units entered Armenia and declared Soviet rule there. It was clear that the red arc was encircling the Democratic Republic of Georgia. In order to respond to the anticipated threats and take appropriate defensive measures, the highest state governing body – the "Defense Council" – was established in Georgia, an organization responsible for strengthening the country's defense capabilities. The Council included the Government members of the Republic, the leadership of the People's Guard, and the Chief of General Staff.

The first meeting of the Defense Council took place on November 9, 1920.¹³ At the second meeting of the Council, held on November 11, the Defense Fund was established, to which 2 billion Rubles were deposited.¹⁴ The №4 and №10 meetings of the Defense Council, which took place on 12 and 19 November 1920, respectively, were very important. These sessions of the Defense Council were chaired by the Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Noe Jordania. The issue of "immediate deployment of forces to the southern part of Borchalo uyezd and declaration of martial law" was raised as

the third item on the meeting's agenda. The situation was such that by this time, the intervention of the 15th Army Corps of the Kemal Turkish Armed Forces had already begun in the western part of Armenia. In order to protect and secure the Armenian population living in the lower part of Borchalo, the so-called "neutral zone" of Lore, from the further aggression of the Turks, the delegation of the Republic of Armenia requested the Georgian side to deploy Georgian military units in the southern part of Borchalo uyezd. The request was immediately granted.¹⁵

The minutes of the №10 meeting of the Defense Council read:

*№10 meeting of the Defense Council.
November 19, 1920. Top secret.*

*Chairman: Chairman of the Government N. Jordania.
Members: Assistant Defense Minister, General Odishelidze,¹⁶
Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Chichinadze, Chief of the
General Staff of the People's Guard V. Jugheli.
Attendees: Member of the General Staff of the People's
Guard Al. Dgebuadze, Chief of General Staff, General
Zakariadze.*

Section three. *The report of General Odishelidze on the agreement with the Government of Armenia on the neutral zone of Borchalo uyezd.*

Ruling: *For the time being, our troops should remain in the neutral zone, and if the Ottomans occupy Karaklis (present-day Vanadzor, Soviet-era Kirovakan – A.Ch.) and appear at Bezobdali Pass, the troops should be withdrawn from the southern part of Borchalo uyezd and our army should occupy this region by deploying to the southern border of the uyezd.*

Section four. *Report by General Odishelidze on the need to send some of the People's Guard to Borchalo uyezd immediately.*

Ruling: *A recommendation should be made to the General Staff of the People's Guard to always inform the General Staff of all operational orders issued by it to the units.¹⁷*

Units of the Bolshevik 11th Red Army entered Yerevan and declared Soviet rule there on December 2, 1920. To respond to the threats from the Bolsheviks, a so-called "Southeastern Front" was established in Georgia and, on November 22, 1920, General Ioseb Gedevanishvili was appointed as its commander.¹⁸ General Giorgi Mazniashvili was appointed "Commandant of the Tbilisi Fortress District" on December 4.¹⁹

Certain measures were planned to strengthen the country's defense capabilities: mobilization; setting up mines on bridges;



**Sergei Kirov (1886 – 1934) and
Sergo Orjonikidze (1886 – 1937)**

construction of an additional armored train; construction of telegraph lines in the areas of impending aggression; repair of roads; purchase of weapons, equipment, clothing, oil, tires; requisition of horses and carriages; disarming the population in the Lore zone, arranging barracks for the units deployed in the Poilo Bridge area...

At the 22nd session of the Defense Council, on December 13, 1920, General Ilia Odishelidze, Assistant (Deputy) Minister of Defense of Georgia, was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Georgian Armed Forces for Operational Management and Unity of Troops.²⁰

Of significant note is that while working on the archival materials, we came across one particularly interesting document: a top-secret military-strategic report compiled by General Odishelidze on the possible threats posed by the Bolsheviks and the measures required for their prevention. The in-depth professional analysis and the predictions presented in the report are conducted with great accuracy and meticulousness. The logic of the analyst and the strategic comprehension of the theaters of war, the precision of the conclusions, and the unequivocal nature of the requests are clearly visible. At the same time, one can observe the poorly covered feeling of inner alarm that is visible throughout the document. The following archival document is the original. It is a text printed in blue ink on a typewriter in Russian, and it fully reflects the military-operational situation in the Transcaucasian

region at the beginning of 1921. The document is quite voluminous, so we will emphasize only the most important sections.

"To the Government of the Republic of Georgia.

Assistant to the Minister of Defense.

January 3, 1921.

№64/49

Tbilisi. Top Secret.

Upon review, return immediately to the Defense Council.

Copy: To Chief of the General Staff of the People's Guard,
Minister of Defense.

Note 1. The official written report, signed by me and the Chief of General Staff, was submitted earlier, in October and November 1920. Even earlier than that, I officially reported to the government on it verbally at one of their meetings. The minutes of these sessions are available. The content the reports of October and November 1920 are essentially the same: due to the imminent war with Russia, they requested the strengthening and training of the army.

Note 2. In November 1920, I made an official report to the Joint Commission of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs and to the factions of the Constituent Assembly – overall, four times in October-November. And always with one conclusion: **we face a fatal threat.** (This phrase is underlined by General Odishelidze – A.Ch.)

As early as in November and early December of the last year, based on all the information available to us, it was clear that the Soviet Russian command was planning a full-scale offensive against the Republic in mid-December, but **apparently calculations relied too heavily on the disturbance from within the country, which should have served as a signal for an invasion.** However, the political circumstances within Russia itself, as noted by the 11th Army Commander Hecker, thwarted this plan, and the intended attack did not materialize.


But postponing December's planned attack does not mean the disappearance of the threat from Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks are preparing for war against us, as can be seen from the report of the Commander of the 11th Army, who recommends delaying the attack on Georgia until certain conditions are met: the consolidation of seven infantry divisions and a second cavalry army in Azerbaijan (30,000 bayonets and 5,000 swords); storing the bread supplies in Ganja for December and January; reaching an agreement with the Turkish command to secure a Soviet attack from the Turkish side (exactly as in the text – Обеспечивающего Советского наступление со стороны Турокъ – А. Ch.); and, finally, the regrouping of the 9th Army (located in the Kuban region), on which Commander-in-Chief Kamenev²¹ issued an order.²²



Giorgi Mazniashvili (1870 – 1937)



**Nikoloz (Parmen)
Chichinadze
(1873 – 1921)**



**Aleksandre
Dgebuadze
(1882 – 1937)**



**Ilia Odishelidze
(1865 – 1924)**



**Aleksandre
Zakariadze
(1884 – 1957)**

Then General Odishelidze talks about the condition of the Georgian Armed Forces and the urgent measures needed to increase its combat capability. First of all, it is a description of the military-political circumstances of that moment. Based on his analysis of the intelligence information, he informs the Defense Council that an active group of the 11th Russian Bolshevik Red Army consisting of 6-7 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions (30 000 bayonets and 4-5 thousand swords) would march against the Eastern Front from the Red Bridge to Zakatala; one division (up to 8000) per location was allocated to cover the passive directions of Vladikavkaz and Sochi. If we add to this the possibility of an Ossetian invasion of the Tskhinvali region from the North Caucasus, up to 3,000 men (according to intelligence in the North Caucasus), then Soviet Russia was expected to invade Georgia with 40,000 Bolshevik infantry and 5,000 cavalry units. At the same time, the active group of the enemy, an army of 30,000 infantry, would act against Georgia at the eastern and southeastern borders.

He also speaks of the fact that in the event of a war with Georgia, the already Sovietized Armenian government would,

of course, side with the Russians, and in that case, along with the 11th Army of the Russian Bolsheviks, a Soviet Armenian army of 10-15,000 would also have to be considered.

Afterwards, he discusses the Kemalists, and makes an accurate prediction that in the early stages of the war, the Kemalists would not start active hostilities right away and would wait for the outcome of the initial battles. In case of a Georgian defeat, they would immediately occupy the areas that were handed over to them through the Brest-Litovsk truce,²³ that is, the Batumi district and Ardagan. At this point, we also read the assessment of the Turkish Kemalists forces deployed in the Transcaucasia – the 35,000-strong contingent of the 15th Army Corps.



Valiko Jugheli, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Guard (back seat, on the right)



Negotiations of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

Odishelidze concludes that in case of a war with Soviet Russia, the Georgian side would be dealing with 50 to 60 thousand Russian-Armenian troops, and with the Turks joining them, the number would rise 75 to 90 thousand, while the most active theater of war would be seen in the southeast, the southeastern borders of Georgia, to capture Tbilisi - the administrative, political, and military center of the Republic.

Later, General Odishelidze noted that, based on these data, as well as Georgia's geographical and strategic location (central location and maneuvers on the internal operational lines), it would be necessary to immediately take the initiative and allocate forces superior to the enemy at every part of the border. For example, in case of a Soviet attack, 35,000 troops were to be deployed along the eastern borders, and 10,000 were to be mobilized in the south, with 15,000 troops remaining in reserve for other locations. Thus, the total number of Georgian armed forces should have been 60,000 bayonets and swords. In order to carry out successful defensive battles, the character of the Georgian troops conduct needed to be active, fast, and energetic, which was essential, on the one hand, due to the strategic situation of the Georgian side, and on the other hand, due to the economic situation, which would not allow for waging a prolonged war. General Odishelidze, as a highly experienced and professional military man, emphasized "the character of our soldiers, who were committed to heroism and quick action, but did not like long hardship."

The situation described required the extreme mobility of troops, which would depend on the condition of the movement notification system. In this regard, it would have been necessary to take decisive measures – among them the immediate provision of the railway with the necessary amount of fuel to achieve the required speed in case of war. However, the mobility of troops required not only the existence of proper roads, but also functional carrier means. The number of horses in the artillery and cavalry units was also important, yet, in this respect, the Georgian army was in an extremely difficult situation. As of December 1920, only 40% of the troops' staff needs were met, while the horses at the army's disposal were in a very bad condition due to the lack of food. In fact, the means of transportation was old, damaged, and unsuitable for long campaigns.

Then, General Odishelidze describes the combat dislocation of the Georgian regular army units and divisions. He notes that instead of 60 thousand, there were only 25 thousand strong ready for combat, and they were deployed as follows: Gagra district – 1900 bayonets, Batumi district – 4900, Akhaltsikhe-Akhalkalaki-Ardagani district – 4500, Lagodekhi district – 1000, Kazbegi district – 150, Southeast Front – 9500. The reserve in Tbilisi stood at 2500 bayonets.

He went on to speak about the need for urgent mobilization measures and the purchase of quartermaster property, weapons, and ammunition, as well as the need to construct additional telegraph lines and bridges over the Mtkvari and Debeda rivers and set up barracks for the personnel. The report separately highlights the issue of the purchase of bombers, vehicles, and gasoline.

The report of General Odishelidze to the Defense Council to the Government of Georgia on January 3, 1921, ends as follows:

"Thus, in order to ensure our security and because of the threat of imminent war with Soviet Russia next spring in my opinion (the last phrase is underlined by General Odishelidze – A. Ch.) we must urgently take the following measures:

1. The urgent conscription of the recruit contingent of 1920;
2. Urgently prepare everything to increase the number of troops to 60,000, and to 75,000 including the rear, via the deployment of an additional contingent and reserve. To do this, we must immediately purchase the required number of horses, oxen, clothing, equipment, weapons, and ammunition. The required amount of food and forage should be stored;
3. Setting the road system in order, which is illustrated in the presented report, providing the railway with the required amount of oil, as well as constructing the railway line on the route Tsnori Water - Lagodekhi;
4. Construction of the telegraph lines according to the report;
5. Building of storage rooms for troops at the theaters of war;
6. Providing technical troops with gasoline and rubber;
7. Finally, the purchase of bombers.

*I consider it urgent to take all these measures to ensure positive results in the event of the impending war. **Delaying this will put us in an extremely difficult situation in the near future** (the last sentence is underlined by General Odishelidze – A. Ch.).*

*Original signatories: General Odishelidze;
Chief of General Staff, General Zakariadze;²⁴
Correct: I. Odishelidze".*

The subsequent course of history clearly showed that General Odishelidze's perspective and the actual military-political situation in Transcaucasia at the beginning of 1921, that is the ongoing operational situation, the deployment of opposing forces to the theaters of hostilities, the threats facing Georgia and the ways to prevent them, were accurately assessed. Back then, in early 1921, the political elite of the

Democratic Republic of Georgia failed to act adequately, once again, refusing to listen to the voice of truth. His Majesty the History made an entirely different ruling...

Just a few days after reading this report, on January 24, 1921, I. Stalin raised the issue of military interference in the affairs of Georgia before the members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (RCP (B)). The draft resolution was written by Lenin himself. In it, we read:

- 1. To instruct the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs to prolong the severance of relations with Georgia, at the same time to gather accurate material on its violations of the May 7 agreement ...*
- 2. Let's ask the Caucasus Front how prepared our military forces are for an immediate and forthcoming war with Georgia ...*
- 3. Instruct the Military-Revolutionary Council and the Caucasus Front, if necessary, to prepare for war with Georgia.*

The proposal written by Lenin was approved. Thus, the fate of the Republic of Georgia, and the issue of its occupation was decided at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) on January 26, 1921. The rest depended on the Red Army.²⁵

There were only a few days left before the beginning of the Bolshevik armed intervention and the end of the first Georgian Republic. These categorical demands made by General Odisshelidze to the Defense Council and the Government of Georgia, unfortunately, remained "a voice of one crying in the wilderness".



Vladimir Lenin
(1870 — 1924)



Joseph Stalin
(1878 — 1953)

And even today, a century later, General Odisshelidze's repeatedly sounded alarming phrase in the late 1920s and early 1921, "we face a fatal threat," is resounding once again...

Notes:

- ¹ И. С. Минц, Победа советской власти в Закавказье, Москва, 1929, с. 5.
- ² Essays on the History of Georgia, Volume VI. Tbilisi. 1973. p. 444.
- ³ А. Б. Кадишев, Интервенция и гражданская война в Закавказье, Военное издательство министерства обороны союза ССР, Москва, 1960, с. 269.
- ⁴ Г. Уратадзе, Общественное движение в Грузии в 1821-1921 гг., Париж, 1939, с. 179.
- ⁵ Vakhtang Guruli. Georgian-Russian relations (1483-1921). "Universal". Tbilisi. 2011. p. 121.
- ⁶ Sergei Mironovich Kirov (real surname Kostrikov) (1886-1934) - professional revolutionary, Russian and Soviet statesman and political figure, one of the leaders and active participants of the Soviet Red Terror. Bolshevik, member of the Russian Social-Democratic Workers' Party (RSDWP) since 1904. Member of the Military Revolutionary Council of the 11th Red Army and head of the diplomatic mission of Soviet Russia in the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1920.
- ⁷ Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia, Special Report No6 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, Under Authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1955, p. 19.
- ⁸ Ivane Nanaushvili. What everyone in the free world should know about Russia. Tbilisi. 2012. p. 120.
- ⁹ Georgian National Archives. Central State Historical Archive (hereinafter GNA. CSHA). Fund 1969, Record 2, Case 27, Sheet 149.
- ¹⁰ V. Tevzadze. Records of a Georgian officer. "Science". Tbilisi. 1990. p. 42.
- ¹¹ Anatoly Ilyich Hecker (Rus. Анатолий Ильич Геккер) (1888-1937 г.г.) – A Russified German born and raised in Tbilisi. Former officer of the Russian Imperial Army, rottmeister of the General Staff of the Army. Later, from March 1918 – a Red commander, komkor. Active participant of the WWI and the Russian Civil War. Commander of the Russian 11th Army Bolsheviks in 1920-1921.
- ¹² Magazine "Caucasus" XV. Caucasus. Recueil littéraire et historique (in Georgian). Paris. 1971. P. 56-57.
- ¹³ GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 1.
- ¹⁴ GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 2.
- ¹⁵ GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 4.
- ¹⁶ Ilia Odishelidze (1865-1936) - Georgian military leader and statesman, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Lieutenant-General of the General Staff of the Russian Imperial Army and General of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Knight of the Cross of George. Participant and commander of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and World War I.
- ¹⁷ GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 11.
- ¹⁸ Ioseb (Soso) Gedevanishvili (1873-1939) - Georgian politician and military figure, revolutionary. Playwright, writer, and publicist. Captain of the Russian Imperial Army and General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Member of the Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Commander of the South-Eastern Front during the period of November, 1920 February, 1921. On his installment in the position, see: GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 13
- ¹⁹ Giorgi Mazniashvili (1870-1937) - Georgian military figure and Commander. Officer of the Russian Imperial Army, Major General and General of the Georgian Army. Active participant in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and World War I. Knight of the Cross of George. Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. On his installment in the position, see GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheet 22. The head of the Tbilisi garrison from December 1920. Commander of the Soghanlughli Front of the Russian-Georgian War in February 1921. National Hero of Georgia.
- ²⁰ GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 14, sheets (27-28).
- ²¹ Sergei Sergeevich Kamenev (Russian: Сергей Сергеевич Каменев) (1881-1936) - Colonel of the Imperial Army of Russia and Commander-in-Chief of the Worker-Peasant Red Army of Soviet Russia, the First Class Comandarm. Active participant in the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and the Russian Civil War.
- ²² GNA. CSHA. Fund 1969, Record 4, case 18, sheet (1-8).
- ²³ The Brest-Litovsk Treaty was a breakaway peace treaty reached on March 3, 1918, at a conference in Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and the alliance of four (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria), ceasing the Russian participation in WWI. Pursuant to Article IV, Paragraph 3 of this Agreement, "Russian troops were to be withdrawn immediately from the Ardagan, Kars, Arzrum regions, and the Batumi district. Russia was not to interfere in the national and international relations of these regions, leaving it the prerogative of the local population. The reorganizations in the region were to be continued by neighboring countries, especially Turkey."
- ²⁴ Alexander Zakariadze (1884-1957) - Chief of the General Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces. Georgian military figure, Colonel of the General Staff of the Russian Imperial Army, General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and General of the Division of the Polish Army. Participated in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, World Wars I and II.
- ²⁵ A. Bendianishvili. The First Republic of Georgia (1918-1921). Tbilisi. 2001. p. 321.

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