Author: David Batashvili

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 25 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of January 2025. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • The authorities of Poland stated on 28 January 2025 that Russian intelligence agencies had been recruiting Polish nationals on the dark net, offering them 3,000-4,000 euros to spread disinformation, in order to influence Poland’s presidential election campaign.
  • On 10 January, Poland said it had identified “a Russian group tasked with influencing Polish [May 2025 presidential] elections through disinformation and stoking instability.”

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, during January 2025, Russia completed the capture of the city of Kurakhove, and advanced in the area south of Pokrovsk. In the Kursk administrative region, Russia slowly squeezed the area of Ukrainian control.

 

Objective 10: Achieving decisive influence over Georgia

  • The Wall Street Journal’s material from 31 January covered Russia’s development of a naval base at the port of Ochamchire in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia region.

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • As of late January 2025, Russia’s Africa Corps reportedly was deploying “transmission equipment and radars at the Faya-Largeau base in northern Chad.”
  • On 5 January, Reuters reported Russian mercenaries‘ participation in a recent attack by Mali’s ruling regime against the Tuaregs.
  • On 18 January, Russian sources reported the presence of a large number of Russian military armored vehicles in Mali, apparently delivered there for the Russian Africa Corps forces.
  • Russian sources reported the participation of Russia’s Wagner Group forces in the Central African Republic government’s operations against the rebels in the area of Bambari.
  • On 29 January, Russia delivered4 thousand tons of diesel fuel for the Central African Republic.

 

Objective 20: Alignment with China

  • An FPRI material from 28 January reported increased number of Russia-China joint military activities in the Pacific, including military exercises and patrols.

 

Serving Objective 21: Alignment with Iran

  • On 17 January, Russia and Iran signed a strategic partnership treaty involving strengthened bilateral cooperation in security and defense, joint military exercises, and further development of their military-technical collaboration, as well as an agreement to “work together to create a modern payment system that is independent of third countries, with settlement in national currencies.”

 

Serving Objective 26: Developing cooperation platforms with non-Western powers

  • On 9 January, Russia’s foreign ministry issued a statement welcoming Indonesia joining BRICS, noting it has the largest economy and population in southeast Asia and “shares the values of BRICS.” According to Moscow, Indonesia’s membership of BRICS will contribute to the formation of the “multipolar world order.”