Author: David Batashvili

 

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 24 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of December 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

 

Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces

  • On 3 December, Intelligence Online revealed that “through a network of Russia-backed Romanian operators, the Kremlin is now behind a push” to get elected as Romania’s president Calin Georgescu, the winner of the first round of the presidential election held on 24 November 2024.
  • On 4 December, Romania’s authorities confirmed that Russia had conducted a “major attempt to interfere in the country’s presidential elections using the social media platform TikTok, and with a series of cyber-attacks.” The Russian campaign on social media reportedly was “highly organised.” Romania’s security council said the country was a target of “aggressive hybrid Russian attacks” during the recent elections.
  • As of 8 December, Romanian authorities were investigating about 20 armed men affiliated with the pro-Russian presidential candidate Georgescu and “suspected of planning to stoke unrest in the capital.”

 

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • On 31 December, the US sanctioned Russian military intelligence assets for targeting American “election processes and institutions” and seeking “to divide the American people through targeted disinformation campaigns.” According to the US authorities, “these actors sought to stoke sociopolitical tensions and undermine our election institutions during the 2024 US general election.”

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, during December 2024 Russians continued to gradually advance in the area south of Pokrovsk city, and around Kurakhove.

 

Objective 10: Achieving decisive influence over Georgia

  • On 10 December, the head of the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR)Sergey Naryshkin praised the Ivanishvili regime in Georgia and its “victory” in the fraudulent general election, saying Georgia was now turning away from the West.
  • On 30 December, Russian foreign minister Lavrov defended Georgia’s fraudulent general election in October 2024, saying that the Georgian authorities “want to develop a sovereign policy that reflects national interests, and not to be a pawn in the Westerners’ hands.”

 

Objective 12: Absorbing Belarus

  • On 6 December, Russia and Belarus signed a “treaty that obliges the two countries to preserve the inviolability of the external border” of the Union State – an integration format currently including only these two countries which Russia seeks to gradually develop into a confederacy or even federation-like arrangement. The treaty to “preserve the border” includes “Russian tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belarus.”

 

Objective 14: Entrenching Russian influence in the MENA region

  • In early December, the Russian air force kept conducting strikes in a failed attempt to slow down the rebel advance on Damascus until the Assad regime’s fall on 8 December 2024.

 

Objective 15: Entrenching Russian influence in the Western Balkans

  • On 25 December, the Russian foreign ministry expressed support for the Vucic government in Serbia, attacking the protests taking place against it and calling them “an attempt to change the legitimate government” through a “color revolution.”

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • On 10 December, CSIS reported continued development of Russia’s military bases in Mali with Moscow appearing “committed to maintaining or even increasing its military presence” in the country.

 

Objective 18: Gaining strategic presence on the waterways connecting the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean basins

  • It was revealed in December 2024 that Russia had unsuccessfully attempted to induce the military government of Sudan to grant it a naval station in Port Sudan by offering the Sudanese the S-400 air defense systems.

 

Objective 19: Gaining strategic superiority in the Arctic region

  • On 18 December, the Russian foreign ministry accused Norway of waging a “campaign in favor of militarization of the Svalbard archipelago,” calling “any such aggressive intention” on Norway’s part “a dangerous provocation that can result in bringing military potential into the Arctic region.”

 

Objective 20: Alignment with China

  • On 30 December, Russian foreign minister Lavrov attacked America’s support of Taiwan, saying the US was giving it weapons, supporting separatism, conducting “provocative actions” in the Strait of Taiwan, and insisting on “maintaining the status quo which means continuation of the existing state of affairs indefinitely.” Lavrov reiterated that Russia “firmly supported” China’s actions directed at the “unification of the country.”

 

Objective 27: Alignment with North Korea

For the first time since the launch of the Russian Geostrategy Monitor, we are adding a new Objective to The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework which serves as the basis of the Monitor. The new Objective, Alignment with North Korea, serves Goal 5: Russia’s alignment with other major adversaries of the US. While North Korea by no means is a major power, it has become clear that Russia’s cooperation with it has gone beyond the specific utilitarian purpose of getting help in the war against Ukraine, and instead is part of the general pattern of Russia’s strategy to cooperate with the powers that are able and willing to create serious geopolitical problems for the United States and its allies. Exacerbating the nuclear and general military threat coming from North Korea can result in additional diversion of US resources to East Asia, which Moscow can hope might help it achieve its geostrategic goals in other parts of the world, particularly in Europe.

  • A Chatham House material from 4 December summed up the latest developments in the Russia-North Korea partnership, stating that the “relationship has moved beyond the merely transactional to become a longer-term strategic and ideological partnership.”
  • On 4 December, Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte stated that “in return for troops and weapons, Russia is providing North Korea with support for its missile and nuclear programmes.”