Author: David Batashvili

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 22 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of October 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • On 23 October, Finland’s authorities stated the country was “experiencing disruptions, acts of sabotage, various types of damage, and instrumentalised migration, among other things” committed by Russia.
  • A Reuters material from 21 October described Russia’s ongoing campaign of sabotage in Europe aiming among other things at “undermining European trust in governments,” and making multiple European countries’ “populations feel vulnerable and unsafe.”
  • Britain’s MI5 intelligence service stated on 8 October that Russian intelligence was conducting and intensifying covert efforts with a “sustained mission” “to generate mayhem on British and European streets, ” doing so “with increasing recklessness.”

 

Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region

  • On 24 October, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Russia had “provided targeting data for Yemen’s Houthi rebels as they attacked Western ships in the Red Sea with missiles and drones earlier this year,” with this satellite data passed by the Russians to the Houthis through “members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who were embedded with the Houthis in Yemen.”
  • On 1 October, the Russian foreign ministry condemned Israel‘s launch of a land operation against Hezbollah in south Lebanon, calling it “an armed aggression” against Lebanon.

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, during October 2024 Russians continued to gradually advance south and southeast of Pokrovsk, and in the area of Kurakhove.

 

Objective 10: Achieving decisive influence over Georgia

  • On 28 October, Moscow expressed support for the Ivanishvili regime after the fraudulent Georgian legislative election on 26 October, denouncing the US and EU calls for an investigation into violations during the vote, and accusing the West of trying to destabilize Georgia.
  • Bloomberg’s material from 21 October described a Russian “comprehensive espionage and hacking campaign” in Georgia in 2017-2020 resulting in the Russian intelligence’s penetration and access to the Georgian “Foreign Ministry, Finance Ministry, central bank and key energy and telecommunications providers,” “electricity companies, oil terminals, media platforms and government departments,” “power and communications networks,” “multiple IT systems at Georgia’s national railway company,” and the Central Election Commission. Such Russian ops reportedly had not been limited to the 2017-2020 period only, as “Russia has carried out operations similar in scope more recently.”

 

Objective 11: Achieving decisive influence over Moldova

  • A BBC material from 20 October described Russia’s efforts to sway the 20 October presidential election and the EU integration referendum in Moldova by massive bribing of voters. According to the material “by early October as many as 130,000 voters had received payment through this scheme – about 10% of the active electorate.”
  • On 21 October, Moscow claimed that Moldova’s presidential election had been “not free,” saying results of the election and the Moldovan EU integration referendum were questionable.

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • Russian sources reported in October 2024 that in the middle of August troops of Russia’s Africa Corps had arrived in Equatorial Guinea to support the local ruling regime.
  • The Economist reported on 17 October that Russia was developing a military base in the Central African Republic “intended to host 10,000 troops by 2030 and serve as a hub for Russian military operations in Africa.”
  • On 15 October, Africa Intelligence reported that Russia’s satellite regime in the Central African Republic had launched the process of adopting a Russian-style foreign influence law “aimed at monitoring any private individuals or legal entities whom the authorities consider to be ‘financially controlled’ from abroad.”
  • A New York Times material from 14 October described Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts attacking US-funded programs in Africa fighting against malaria, dengue fever and other infectious diseases on the continent.

 

Objective 20: Alignment with China

  • On 3 October, Russian foreign minister Lavrov said that Russia stood with China against the US regarding Asia-Pacific issues. Lavrov particularly stressed Russian support of China regarding the issue of Taiwan.
  • On 1 October, the Chinese coast guard entered “the Arctic sea for the first time, for a joint patrol with Russian counterparts.”
  • On 8 October, Russian media reported that Russia’s and China’s warships had “practiced anti-submarine missions in the northwestern Pacific Ocean as part of a joint patrol in the Asia-Pacific region.”

 

Objective 21: Alignment with Iran

  • Russian and Iranian navies launched joint drills in the Indian Ocean on 19 October.

 

Objective 26: Developing cooperation platforms with non-Western powers

  • On 10 October, Russia called on BRICS member states “to create an alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to counter political pressure from Western nations.” Russian finance minister Siluanov accused the IMF and the World Bank of “not working in the interests of BRICS countries,” saying that the global financial system was controlled by the West and therefore BRICS needed to create an alternative “similar to the Bretton Woods institutions, but within the framework of our community, within the framework of BRICS.”
  • The sixth meeting of “the Moscow Format” regional platform on Afghanistan was held on 4 October in Moscow with representatives from China, Iran, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as Taliban’s “foreign minister.”
  • On 18 October, foreign ministers of Russia, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia held the third meeting of the 3+3 regional platform in Istanbul, Turkey.