Author: David Batashvili

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 18 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of June 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

Objective 2: Strengthening the Western political forces considered by Moscow to be inimical to the Western-led international order, and the Kremlin’s relationships with such forces

  • On 3 June 2024, the Washington Post revealed that Russia had funneled “hundreds of thousands of euros — up to 1 million a month — to dozens of far-right politicians in more than five [European] countries to plant Kremlin propaganda in Western media that would sow division in Europe and bolster the position of pro-Russian candidates in this week’s European Parliament elections.”
  • The Telegraph reported on 26 June that a security adviser in Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party, Tamara Volokhova, was suspected by the French intelligence agency DGSI of being Russia’s agent of influence.

 

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

  • On 10 June, the Czech prime minister Petr Fiala stated that the recent attempted arson attack on a public transport depot in Prague was likely organized and financed by Russia, and was part of a wider “campaign of sabotage being run by Moscow against European countries,” including recent arson attacks in Poland and Lithuania.

 

Objective 7: Achieving instability in the Western Balkans

  • On 11 June, Russian foreign minister Lavrov spoke at the opening ceremony of a Russian embassy branch in the capital of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Banja Luka. Lavrov said the opening of the embassy branch pointed at the growing “importance and respectability of Republika Srpska as a participant of international processes.”

 

Objective 8: Undermining US Foreign Policy in the Western Hemisphere and Objective 17: Entrenching Russian influence in the Western hemisphere

  • In a meeting on 11 June between the Russian and Venezuelan foreign ministers, Lavrov stressed Moscow’s “constant support” for the Maduro regime in its efforts “to stabilize internal situation considering the coming presidential election in July of this year.”

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War during June 2024, the Russians continued to attack at numerous sections of the frontline. The most important developments in this regard were continuing Russian advances in the general direction of Pokrovsk and Selydove (west of Avdiivka), and the launch of the Russian operation aiming to take the city of Toretsk.
  • On 19 June, Russia signed a strategic partnership agreement with North Korea, securing further supplies of North Korean arms for the war against Ukraine in exchange for the Russian military technology.
  • The Wall Street Journal reported on 23 June that the fire at a military factory on the outskirts of Berlin, Germany in May 2024 had been “set by Russian saboteurs trying disrupt shipments of critical arms and ammunition to Ukraine.”

 

Objective 10: Achieving decisive influence over Georgia

  • On 4 June, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Galuzin said Moscow could “see attempts by the Westerners to escalate the situation in Georgia ahead of the parliamentary elections set for October,” adding that “we don’t rule out that the goal is to try to implement a ‘Maidan-like’ scenario for a change of government.” Galuzin also expressed support for the Ivanishvili regime regarding the matter of the Russian-style “foreign influence” law recently adopted by Tbilisi.

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • On 5 June, Russian foreign minister Lavrov expressed Moscow’s support for the regional alliance of Russia’s satellite regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. According to Lavrov, the alliance and its further development would make the Sahel region “healthier.”
  • Also on 5 June, Moscow announced it would send additional military supplies and instructors to Burkina Faso in order to strengthen the country’s military capabilities.