Author: Nino Macharashvili

According to reports, on September 2, 2024, Turkey officially applied for BRICS membership. While Turkish officials have expressed interest in joining the bloc before, this marks a formal step toward membership. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan first voiced his desire to join the alliance in July 2018, and even attended the BRICS summit in South Africa. Given Ankara’s rhetoric and actions over the past decade, Turkey’s decision to finally apply for BRICS membership should come as no surprise. For context, BRICS is an economic bloc founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China. Later, South Africa joined the alliance, and, in 2024, the bloc expanded to include Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Many countries today are eager to join the bloc, but Turkey’s application stands out, since it is controversial. Despite the recent disagreements with the West, Turkey remains a member state of NATO. In contrast, BRICS declares itself an alternative to the international order dominated by the West, with NATO serving as the key defender of that order. If Turkey joins BRICS, it will be the first NATO member to align with an alliance dominated by Russia and China, both authoritarian regimes.

In this blog, we will briefly discuss why Turkey wants to join BRICS, and what developments Turkey’s interest in BRICS might lead to.

Reasons for Turkey’s desire to join BRICS

Over the past decade, Turkey has actively pursued an independent foreign policy based on its national interests. As such, Turkey’s desire to join BRICS can be perceived as a tactical move by Ankara to increase its weight in political trade with its Western partners. Although this move is clearly part of a political game, Turkey also has several clearly defined strategic interests in relation to BRICS:

  • Economic – the fact that the center of the global economy is moving from the West to the non-Western world is no longer news. Against this background, Turkey seeks to diversify its trade and investment ties, especially among BRICS members. The Turkey-BRICS trade volume increased from 74.3 billion dollars to 121.3 billion dollars from 2013 to 2023. A significant share of that went to trade with Russia and China. Turkey’s trade with these two states amounted to 105 billion dollars in 2023, which is 17% of its total foreign trade. Turkey has maintained strong economic ties with Russia, which have deepened even further. Additionally, China presents an opportunity for Turkey to attract more investments and foster close cooperation across various sectors, including energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, and green technologies. The fact that the Chinese electric car manufacturer BYD recently agreed to build a $1 billion manufacturing plant in Turkey proves that the interest is mutual. Also, in 2022, the Ministry of Trade of Turkey approved the Far Countries Strategy, which aims to increase trade links with economies that are, on average, 8,500 km away from Turkey. This strategy includes the large economies of the Global South – China, Brazil and India.

However, despite the fact that BRICS produces on average 36-37% of the global GDP, the European Union remains the main partner for Turkey in terms of trade and investment. By showing interest in BRICS, Turkey is likely aiming to continue pursuing its own interests through a strategy of playing a double game, a tactic it has effectively employed thus far. As an example, we can look to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, after which Turkey redoubled trade and energy relations with Moscow on the one hand, and on the other supported Ukraine by selling it weapons, partnering in the defense industry, and restricting the Russian fleet’s access to the Black Sea.

  • Geopolitical – Turkey’s geopolitical views are far from the West and closer to BRICS. To summarize this, it is useful to recall Ankara’s position on the last two most important events in world politics: 1. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and 2. The Israel-Hamas war. Turkey has clearly aligned itself more with BRICS than with the US and EU. Geopolitically, joining the alliance offers Turkey the opportunity to find like-minded people in the states of the Global South and establish new partnership relations. However, BRICS became especially “attractive” to Erdogan after it expanded in 2024 to include the Middle Eastern states.

The freezing of Turkey’s accession to the European Union is an additional geopolitical factor for Turkey’s desire to join BRICS. In the early 2000s, when the EU was a landmark of political and economic reforms, Turkey’s aspiration to join led to a number of changes in its domestic and foreign policy. However, recently, the EU’s policies have become unacceptable not only to the Turkish government, but also to the opposition and the civil sector. Meanwhile, the prospect of Turkey joining the European Union has all but faded, with EU officials citing democratic backsliding and regression of the rule of law as key reasons. At this stage, BRICS is an opportunity for Turkey to establish new partnership relations free from external pressures and self-serving agendas.

Yet, it is unlikely that Turkey will perceive BRICS as an alternative to relations with the West. Turkey’s interest in the alliance may simply be a way for it to maintain strategic autonomy in its relations with both the West and non-Western world in parallel. Erdogan’s post-Western narrative is reinforced; Western authority in Turkey’s political spectrum is diminished; and strategic autonomy is seen as an opportunity to increase Turkey’s political clout. It is clear that Turkey’s institutional ties with the West remain strong- with its being a NATO member and a participant of the EU customs union. As such, it will be interesting to observe how Turkey’s growing interest in BRICS develops, and how it balances these dual relationships moving forward.

Prospects of Turkey joining BRICS

Turkey has already officially applied for BRICS membership, and Erdogan attended the 16th BRICS summit at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin. However, Turkey’s potential membership depends on the bloc’s invitation, which requires consensus from all member states. While BRICS has shown no desire to expand, Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister Sergey Lavrov has indicated that the priority at this stage is the integration of new members. Yet, India opposesTurkey’s accession to BRICS due to its close relations with Pakistan. Despite these disagreements, the 2024 expansion controversy was resolved fairly effectively, so it is possible that we may yet see Turkey as a member of BRICS, subject to a political trade-off.

Regardless of whether Turkey joins BRICS, its interest in the alliance represents a significant geopolitical move. It will be interesting to see how the West will respond: will it ignore this development and continue its normal relations with Turkey, or will it decide that Turkey’s BRICS membership does not correspond to Turkey’s obligations towards Western institutions?

It is crucial for the West to perceive Turkey’s interest in BRICS as a potential shift in its foreign policy. As Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan pointed out, Turkey would not be interested in BRICS if it was already a member of the European Union. Turkey is a key partner for Europe, especially given its role in shaping European security after the war in Ukraine, and its ability to strengthen Europe’s industrial policy by reducing its dependence on China.

The growing interest in BRICS membership among different countries in the region is unfavorable for Georgia, especially with Azerbaijan also interested in joining the alliance. It is clear that the main motivator behind both states is Russia: Ankara and Baku became interested in the alliance following Putin’s visits to their countries. BRICS appears to be a new mechanism in Moscow’s hands to increase its influence in the region.

 

Conclusion

Turkey’s interest in BRICS is unsurprising given the current geopolitical landscape. Ankara has two distinct goals in joining the alliance: 1. Economic – strengthening trade ties with major Global South economies, especially China, and 2. Geopolitical – maintaining an independent foreign policy and achieving strategic autonomy. However, Turkey’s desire to join BRICS can also be seen as a form of “revenge” against the EU for years of delayed accession talks. Regardless of its specific motivations, Turkey’s move towards BRICS appears to be a calculated gamble by Erdogan, with a goal to maximize benefits for Ankara.

The issue of Turkey joining BRICS depends significantly on both the alliance itself and the West. As we have seen, there is a non-unanimous attitude among the bloc’s members regarding Ankara’s admission to BRICS. India is the opponent. Overcoming resistance will come with a political cost. At the same time, Turkey’s relationship with BRICS will depend on the West’s response. Will the European Union reassess its relations with Turkey and adjust its stance? At this stage, the West’s position is unknown. However, given Turkey’s strategic importance, it is likely the West will need to raise the stakes and make concessions in order to preserve the relationship.