Author: Tata Gelashvili
Introduction
In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, Russia leveraged a wide array of propaganda techniques aimed at deepening political divisions within American society and undermining the integrity of its democratic processes. Information warfare efforts, such as the production of fake videos and the manipulation of social media platforms, targeted key political figures like Vice President Kamala Harris, and attempted to portray U.S. democracy as flawed and ineffective. In this blog, we will analyze Russia’s propagandistic tactics and the instruments it employs, how the U.S. counters these activities, and, ultimately, we will assess how effective these countermeasures are. This issue, while not new, has been evolving and advancing by the year, with disinformation tactics becoming increasingly sophisticated as foreign actors adapt to the changing political and technological landscape.
Russian Tactics and Tools
Undermining Election Integrity and Strengthening Far-Right Rhetoric
One of Russia’s key strategies was to provoke political instability by sowing doubts about the integrity of the elections and promoting far-right ideologies. This approach sought to make American citizens, particularly in swing states, question the fairness and legitimacy of the elections, while amplifying far-right rhetoric that deepened distrust in political institutions. By leveraging social media platforms, AI-driven tools, and disinformation networks, Russia aimed to erode trust in the democratic process and foster division within the electorate.
One prominent example of Russia having undermined U.S. electoral integrity was its propaganda outlet operating in swing state Georgia, the Storm-1516 network, which targeted the state by disseminating false content, including a video that falsely claimed a man had cast multiple votes for Democrat Kamala Harris. The video, which Georgia’s Secretary of State, the FBI, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) identified as a Russian creation, was designed to create doubt about the legitimacy of the election process. Similarly, Russian actors spread fake news in another key swing state, Arizona. A concocted interview claimed that state officials were creating fake ballots and altering voter rolls to favor Harris. These efforts shared the common goal of undermining public trust in the electoral system and painting the election process as fraudulent.
At the same time, Russia amplified far-right rhetoric to further destabilize the political landscape by fostering extremism, particularly among far-right movements that promoted nationalism and challenged democratic values. Russian-backed influence operations exploited this vulnerability by creating and amplifying divisive messages within online echo chambers, where such views were continuously reinforced. In 2024, Kremlin-backed actors deployed specific disinformation campaigns, such as Matryoshka, which spread fabricated stories about the FBI apprehending groups involved in alleged ballot fraud. This new disinformation tactic targeted media and fact-checking communities; however, for conservative voters already concerned about voter fraud, it reinforced their belief that the election process was untrustworthy, thus amplifying anger and frustration toward government institutions and the election itself. On September 4, 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice charged members of Tenet Media with allegedly receiving $9.7 million from a covert Russian operation. The funds had been used to enlist American right-wing influencers to promote pro-Russian narratives and conspiracy theories. Followers of these influencers had reportedly been incited to commit acts such as stealing ballots, intimidating voters, and vandalizing ballot drop-off locations ahead of the election. In another instance, operatives used the Doppelganger campaign, a Russian disinformation operation impersonating Western media sites to broadcast anti-Ukraine fake news, aiming to increase election-related distrust. The U.S. Department of Justice claimed it had disrupted Doppelganger’s malign influence campaigns in the process of its spreading of Russian government propaganda.
Additionally, Russian operatives utilized visual disinformation, such as falsified videos showing the destruction of Donald Trump’s ballots in Pennsylvania. Despite being debunked by officials, these videos circulated widely online, especially in groups where concerns about election fairness were already heightened. By presenting these fabricated visuals as “evidence” of fraud, Russian actors intensified perceptions that the electoral process had been compromised. This manipulation was particularly potent within conservative circles, where Trump supporters were already predisposed to viewing the election with skepticism.
These fabricated narratives intensified existing fears among conservative voters, aligning with their pre-existing political views. The psychological manipulation influenced voter perceptions and weakened the resilience of the democratic system, making it more susceptible to future interference. Russian efforts deepened electoral divisions, amplified polarization, and eroded trust in both the electoral process and mainstream media, particularly among those already skeptical of established sources.
Exploiting Political and Racial Divisions
Russian campaigns often go beyond merely undermining the electoral process, such as by spreading false claims of voter fraud: the broader goal is to deepen political divisions within the U.S., exploiting racial and political divides rather than just influencing the outcome of an election. To implement this strategy, Russia relies on social media platforms, as well as tools like fake accounts, bots, trolls, and targeted advertisements. These platforms provide an ideal space for Russia to quickly and effectively reach wide audiences, amplifying its disinformation efforts.
According to new details from the U.S. Justice Department, the Doppelganger campaign has been leveraging divisions within various racial, ethnic, and political communities in the U.S. and abroad, using key social and political issues to influence public opinion. As outlined in an affidavit, this campaign specifically sought to shape public opinion on the Ukraine war and to influence voters in the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Content was created in Hebrew, English, and Russian to shift perceptions and detach countries like Israel from the Western anti-Russian narrative.
One of the campaign’s central tactics involved leveraging historical memory and cultural symbols to link the Ukrainian government to past negative associations, a method often used by Russian President Vladimir Putin. By focusing on the political unrest in countries such as Israel and others, the campaign sought to sway key voter segments in the U.S. ahead of the 2024 presidential election. This disinformation effort illustrates Russia’s broader strategy to manipulate global opinion and exploit internal divisions within nations to further its geopolitical interests.
During the U.S. electoral campaign, Russia sought to undermine U.S. foreign policy, particularly its involvement in global conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine war, by discrediting it through disinformation. A clear example was the circulation of a deepfake video falsely depicting U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller endorsing Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod. Through these disinformation efforts, Russia aimed to discredit U.S. foreign policy, weaken its global influence, and diminish its credibility, fostering skepticism about U.S. interventionism among American citizens and portraying foreign aid as self-serving or wasteful.
U.S. Responses to Russian Election Interference in 2024
In response to Russia’s continued efforts to interfere in the U.S. electoral process, the U.S. government took a robust approach to counter them. The strategy involved a range of measures that targeted the heart of Russian information warfare strategies, from limiting media influence to addressing the technological threats posed by Russian-backed entities. The collective goal was to protect the integrity of American democratic institutions while minimizing the long-term impact of foreign influence on domestic politics.
A key aspect of the U.S. government’s strategy was the imposition of visa restrictions on Russian operatives, particularly journalists and media personnel who worked under the Kremlin’s influence. By limiting their ability to work freely within the U.S., the State Department aimed to curtail the spread of Russian propaganda, which often masqueraded as independent journalism. This move highlighted the importance of controlling the sources of disinformation—be they state-backed media outlets or individual operatives—and of preventing them from shaping the political discourse in ways that would undermine public confidence in the electoral system. The restrictions also emphasized the need for greater transparency regarding foreign actors attempting to influence U.S. domestic affairs.
Alongside the visa restrictions, the U.S. government took steps to reclassify Russian state-controlled media outlets, such as RT and Sputnik, as foreign missions. This reclassification forced these outlets to disclose their staffing and property ownership, making it harder for them to operate covertly. By exposing the operational structure of these outlets, the U.S. was able to increase transparency and reduce their influence within the country. This move signaled a broader strategy of making foreign interference more visible and subject to public scrutiny, ensuring that citizens were aware of external attempts to manipulate political narratives.
The U.S. also launched the “Rewards for Justice” program, offering substantial monetary rewards for information that led to the identification of individuals behind Russian interference efforts. This initiative targeted Russian hacker groups such as RaHDit, which were linked to operations designed to destabilize U.S. politics. The program served a dual purpose: it incentivized whistleblowers and intelligence gatherers, while creating a deterrent for those involved in such activities.
In addition to criminal measures, the U.S. employed legal tools like criminal indictments and domain seizures to disrupt Russian interference efforts. The U.S. Department of Justice indicted several Russian nationals involved in funneling money through shell companies to support pro-Russia media outlets within the U.S. Furthermore, domain seizures were employed to dismantle the digital infrastructure enabling foreign disinformation campaigns. These legal measures targeted the financial and operational networks that underpinned Russia’s disinformation machinery, effectively limiting foreign agents from operating freely on American soil.
A more proactive response was the U.S. government’s collaboration with technology firms, such as Microsoft, to monitor, identify, and counteract propaganda efforts on digital platforms. This partnership helped remove Russian-backed content from platforms targeted by campaigns like Matryoshka and Doppelganger, both of which were designed to spread fake narratives and influence public opinion. By working closely with the private sector, the U.S. was able to better track and respond to emerging threats in real-time. This cooperation between government and tech companies was essential for keeping pace with rapidly evolving disinformation tactics.
Finally, U.S. intelligence agencies, including the FBI and CISA, issued public warnings about the risks posed by disinformation campaigns, particularly regarding the potential for inciting violence. False narratives, especially those surrounding voter fraud and election integrity, had the capacity to stir civil unrest and exacerbate political tensions.
Conclusion
Russia’s ultimate aim is to destabilize the U.S. over the long run, preventing it from functioning as a cohesive and stable global actor. Russia uses a comprehensive approach, leveraging multiple forms of disinformation to target every segment of American society and weaken the country’s global influence. It is crucial to understand that although Russian propaganda efforts aimed at Kamala Harris played a significant role in the 2024 election’s landscape, they were not the sole determinant of the outcome of the election. Various other factors contributed, including domestic issues such as immigration and economic concerns. These issues resonated deeply with voters, and influenced their perceptions and choices independently of foreign influence. While Russia’s disinformation campaign intensified existing societal divides and amplified distrust in democratic institutions, American voters were also reacting to pressing internal challenges.
American countermeasures against Russian disinformation and foreign interference have been effective, though there is clear room for improvement. While foreign actors, including Russia, attempted to influence the U.S. elections, no evidence shows these efforts altered outcomes or compromised election integrity. Key measures, such as increased monitoring, post-election audits, and infrastructure improvements, were essential for securing the elections. Public service announcements (PSAs) and collaborations with social media companies also helped counter disinformation. The U.S. focused on early detection, using open-source intelligence to track and address disinformation campaigns. These proactive steps, especially nonpartisan warnings, reduced foreign influence, particularly from Russia. However, while effective in addressing immediate threats, these strategies have had mixed results against more sophisticated disinformation tactics. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) highlighted in their joint report that these measures were vital in protecting the integrity of the election process, despite foreign attempts to sway it.
