Author: David Batashvili

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 21 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of September 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

Objective 3: Enhancing internal political instability and polarization within Western states

·       As reported in early September 2024, the United States had uncovered a Russian disinformation and propaganda network having among its objectives “amplifying U.S. domestic divisions in order to weaken U.S. opposition to core Government of Russia interests,” and using “emotionally charged issues in attempts to exploit social tensions and sow division, exacerbating friction in what is already likely to be a contentious election and increasing the likelihood of protests, riots and targeted violence.”

·       The United States indicated on 13 September that Russia had conducted “operations aimed at destabilizing the government of Argentina and escalating tensions with Argentina’s neighbors.”

·       On 9 September, the Polish government stated its security agencies had “neutralised a sabotage operation orchestrated by Russia and Belarus that aimed to destabilise Poland.” On 25 September, Warsaw said that Russia and Belarus had increased their disinformation efforts attacking Polish authorities during the recent major floods in Poland.

 

Objective 5: Thwarting policies of the US and its allies in the MENA region

·       On 18 September, the Russian foreign ministry called Israel‘s pager attack on Hezbollah operatives “a monstrous act of terrorism and hybrid war,” and “a serious challenge to international law.”

·       On 24 September, Russia condemned Israel’s airstrikes against Hezbollah, calling them “indiscriminate.”

·       On 28 September, Moscow attacked Israel’s elimination of the head of Hezbollah, Hasan Nasrallah, calling it “another political assassination committed by Israel.”

 

Objective 6: Disrupting Western influence in the Western Balkans

·       The Wall Street Journal’s material from 30 September described a Russian propaganda and disinformation campaign designed to stir up local opposition to a lithium mine project in Serbia in order to prevent development of this Balkan country’s ties with European states.

Objective 7: Achieving instability in the Western Balkans

·       In September 2024, the Russian foreign ministry continued its series of accusations against Kosovo‘s authorities of an “ethnic cleansing” against Serbs.

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

·       In the Russo-Ukrainian War, in September 2024 Russians launched counterattacks against the Ukrainian-held territory in the Kursk administrative region of Russia. The Russian offensive in south Donbas continued to develop with situation there gradually worsening for Ukraine during the month.

·       In early September, the United States targeted a Russian disinformation network consisting of dozens of websites that, among other purposes, had been aimed at “curbing global support for Ukraine,” with messages like “continued support for Ukraine is a mistake,” and “the Biden administration should just make a peace agreement and move on.”

Objective 11: Achieving decisive influence over Moldova

·       On 13 September, the US imposed sanctions on Russian entities and individuals linked to a “malign influence campaign” in Moldova aiming to influence the outcome of the coming presidential election in the country.

On 27 September, Moldova reported Russian hybrid attacks, “unprecedented” in their intensity and “marked by a diverse arsenal of tactics and a massive influx of dirty money.” Russian actions included financing for a “no” campaign in the upcoming Moldovan referendum on EU membership, as well as support for “pro-Russian political groups and influence campaigns, and widespread disinformation on social media.” Russian proxy actors in Moldova also sought to “sow doubt about the legitimacy of the electoral process to create chaos.”

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

·       On 23 September, Russia signed a deal with its three proxy regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to deploy Russian “telecommunications and remote-sensing satellites” over the three countries. The satellites were to monitor the countries’ border areas and support their regimes’ anti-insurgency operations, among other tasks.

Objective 19: Gaining strategic superiority in the Arctic region

  • A WSJ material from 28 September described Russian subversive activities on Svalbard during the last couple of years, designed to undermine Norway’s sovereignty over the archipelago and boost Russian presence there.

Objective 20: Alignment with China

·       On 10 September, Russian and Chinese navies launched joint exercises in the Sea of Japan.

·       The United States said on 11 September that in exchange for the Chinese help to Russia in its war against Ukraine, Moscow was “helping Beijing develop submarine, aeronautic and missile technologies,” including knowhow “in areas such as stealth and surveillance.” According to the US, this could have a “very significant impact on Chinese capabilities and deployments in the western Pacific.”

·       On 20 September, Russia accused the West of applying “blatant pressure” on China over Taiwan, and undermining regional stability and international security. Moscow also expressed its support to the “Chinese actions to defend its sovereignty.”

·       On 27 September, the US Coast Guard reported “an uptick in Chinese and Russian navy activity around Alaska and the northern Pacific,” with the two navies working together in that region.