Author: David Batashvili

 

The Rondeli Foundation’s Russian Geostrategy Monitor is a monthly brief that tracks Russian geostrategy worldwide employing the framework set in The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy. Russian geostrategic activities are also tracked on the regularly updated interactive Russian Geostrategy Map.

Issue 20 covers Russian geostrategy for the month of August 2024. The numbering and contents of the Outcomes, Goals and Objectives follows The Structure of Modern Russia’s Foreign Strategy framework.

 

Objective 9: Achieving de-sovereignization of Ukraine

  • In the Russo-Ukrainian War, on 6 August, Ukraine launched an offensive in the Kursk administrative region of Russia, capturing part of its territory during the subsequent days and weeks. Meanwhile, Russia continued to gradually advance in the Donbas

 

Objective 10: Achieving decisive influence over Georgia

  • Russian foreign intelligence service, SVR, issued a new statement in support of the Ivanishvili regime in Georgia on 26 August 2024. SVR claimed that Ivanishvili’s ruling Georgian Dream party “is capable of getting a convincing credit of trust from the population” in the coming 26 October Georgian general election. SVR referred to the Georgian opposition parties as “controlled by Washington,” and accused the US of preparing a “color revolution” in Georgia.

 

Objective 15: Entrenching Russian influence in the Western Balkans

  • On 8 August, the Russian foreign ministry accused “certain ill-willed forces,” “certain pseudo-democratic circles” and “puppet media and NGOs” of trying to destabilize political situation in Serbia and acting against the “state leadership.” The Russian statement also praised the president and government of Serbia.

 

Objective 16: Entrenching Russian influence in sub-Saharan Africa

  • On 6 August, during anti-government protests in northern Nigeria, some protesters waved Russian flags, “voicing support for Russian President Vladimir Putin,” calling on Moscow to “rescue” them, and ” calling for a military takeover.”
  • Russian sources reported continued joint operations by the Russian paramilitaries and the Malian ruling regime forces in the area around Tinzaouaten town – the site of their recent heavy defeat by the Tuareg fighters. These operations reportedly included “raids into certain villages” with local residents being captured and taken away.

 

Objective 17: Entrenching Russian influence in the Western hemisphere

  • On 21 August, Moscow expressed its support for the Maduro regime in Venezuela while the latter was in the process of consolidating its authoritarian power in the wake of the rigged presidential election. Russia also accused the US of seeking chaos in Venezuela.

 

Objective 20: Alignment with China

  • On 21 August 2024, the Russian foreign ministry targeted the AUKUS partnership between US, Britain and Australia, calling it a dangerous enterprise and a “very serious geopolitical challenge” threatening world peace and security. The main opponent of the AUKUS is China.

 

Objective 23: Developing partnership with Turkey

  • A material published by the Financial Times on 21 August described Turkey’s emerging long-term dependence on Russia in terms of the functioning of the Russian-built Akkuyu nuclear power plant.