Author: Vasil Ghlonti

 

 

Several personnel changes have recently been made in the Republic of Chechnya, part of the Russian Federation, seeing a number of high-ranking Chechen officials being transferred to Moscow, while others were appointed to different positions within Chechnya itself. These moves come amid growing rumors that the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, is in critical health.

Against this backdrop, our goal is to discuss and analyse the recent developments in Chechnya, so as to determine the purpose of these personnel changes and their potential outcomes.

 

Assessment /Analysis

The fact that Chechnya became one of the main strongholds of the Kremlin in the North Caucasus is due to the symbiosis between President Putin and Ramzan Kadyrov. Over the past decades, Moscow has “tamed” most of the rebel Chechens, reconciled them, and put them in its service. Those who could not be controlled were either physically eliminated or forced to leave their native country and move abroad. To win the hearts of the Chechens, Putin made significant investments in Chechnya, developing it more economically than other North Caucasian republics, and bringing it under his influence with the help of the Kadyrov clan. The special emphasis on Chechnya and Ramzan Kadyrov was, in some ways, a strategic calculation by the Kremlin. This fact has been made particularly clear during the war against Ukraine, seeing the Chechen formations under Ramzan Kadyrov becoming an important component of the Russian military machine. Moreover, Kadyrov’s “Akhmat” regiment was assigned the role of a deterrent military unit, indicating that, on the front line, Putin sometimes trusts Kadyrov’s Chechens more than he does ethnic Russians.

However, to say that Ramzan Kadyrov blindly obeys the Kremlin and follows Putin’s orders without questioning them would be an inaccurate assessment. According to our observations, Kadyrov pursues a rather autonomous policy, and agrees to follow the Kremlin’s instructions only when it benefits him. This is confirmed by the serious financial dividends he received due to his active participation in the occupation of Ukraine. For instance, Mariupol’s ‘Ilyich Iron and Steel Works’ in the Donetsk region came under his control. Initially, Kadyrov’s confidant Valid Korchagin (Geremeev) owned it, but later it was taken over by Alash Dadashov, in parallel considered as the chairman of the sports-combat club “Akhmat.” He also acquired the entire share of a second Mariupol company named ‘Technical Materials.’

According to the available information, Kadyrov has business interests in Kherson and Zaporizhia, where he has appointed his own representatives. It is significant that both Dadashov and Korchagin, behind whom Ramzan Kadyrov stands, have companies not only in the occupied lands of Ukraine, but also throughout Russia, including in Moscow. This indicates that Kadyrov took advantage of the situation, establishing a partnership, rather than a vassal relationship, with Putin, and solidified his presence in Russian business, further strengthening his clan. Ramzan Kadyrov convinced Putin of his indispensability, in doing so obtaining substantial benefits.

In our assessment, Ramzan Kadyrov’s partial independence and autonomy are evident in the fact that he achieved, without a fight, what the late ex-President Dzhokhar Dudayev could not – Kadyrov has effectively removed Chechnya from the legal sphere of Russia. In this North Caucasian republic, Sharia laws prevail, defining the norms of life for the local population. Citizens arriving from other regions of Russia are forced to comply with local religious norms and traditional customs. Chechnya has a dress code, which also sets it apart from the other regions of the Russian Federation. Human rights, as we acknowledge them, do not function in this republic; the protection of women’s rights is entirely neglected, and they do not even have the freedom to have a family according to their own choice. Here, one noteworthy detail captures our attention: in 2023, unidentified individuals brutally beat Russian human rights activist Elena Milashina and lawyer Alexander Nemov, who had come to attend the trial of opposition member Zarema Musaeva. Even the Kremlin was shocked by the move– though human rights defenders are not well-liked in Moscow, the imperial capital realized that in beating the two Moscow-based human rights defenders, the Russian representatives in the capital had been shown their place and forbidden from interfering in Chechnya’s internal affairs.

It is a striking fact that, in Chechnya, as well as in other republics of the North Caucasus, there is a profound civilizational, mental, and cultural incompatibility between Russians and North Caucasians, making the relationship between this region and Moscow highly explosive. For this reason, the Kremlin is forced to refrain as much as possible from excessive interference in the affairs of the region, as this will sooner or later lead to a new war, which is certainly not in the interests of the Russian authorities amid the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin views the North Caucasus as a kind of “hornet’s nest,” the disturbance of which is currently not in its interests. However, it would not be entirely accurate to say that Moscow has given up on keeping Chechnya under control: The Caucasus represents a very vulnerable, explosive region for Russia, and, accordingly, the Kremlin still prioritizes it. Due to these and other factors, the Kremlin seeks to “befriend” Chechnya, and the North Caucasus in general, especially since North Caucasians play a significant role in the war campaign against Ukraine and are very much needed by Moscow.

In this context, interesting personnel changes have recently taken place in Grozny. Specifically, in April 2024, General Apti Alaudinov, the commander of the “Akhmat” regiment, was appointed as the Deputy Chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, an extremely significant position. This importance is underscored by the fact that the chief of this directorate is Deputy Defense Minister General Viktor Goremykin. Alaudinov’s appointment to such a high-ranking position within a structure responsible for the ideological training of Russian army personnel indicates the Kremlin’s great trust in him. It is noteworthy that the given directorate was established on the personal order of President Putin in 2019. In our assessment, Alaudinov’s rise to such a central government body in Russia suggests that the Kremlin considers him an alternative to Ramzan Kadyrov, and it is possible that after Kadyrov, Apti Alaudinov will become the leader of Chechnya.

The Kremlin is actively considering Muslim Khuchiev for a key position as well. Khuchiev, a former head of the Chechen government, former Mayor of Grozny, and former Minister of Territorial Development, National Policy, and Mass Communications of Chechnya, was transferred to Moscow and appointed as an assistant to the Prime Minister of Russia, Mikhail Mishustin, on May 21, 2024. Khuchiev’s graduation from the State Service Academy under the President of Russia in Moscow in 2009 indicates that he is a direct Kremlin cadre in the Chechen government. This move is made in agreement with Ramzan Kadyrov to avoid irritation on his part.

In this context, our attention is further drawn to the fact that on May 14, Magomed Daudov, the Speaker of the Chechen Parliament, stepped down from his role before the end of his term. Daudov is considered one of Kadyrov’s closest associates. It is interesting to us that Daudov is quite experienced in the security sector, and, in recent years, he has undergone significant career advancement. Specifically, in 2023, he became a Major General of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, recently, in April 2024, he received the military rank of Major General. It can be assumed that he is being prepared for further promotion within the security sector. However, considering that Daudov is a former rebel-separatist who once fought against federal troops and was reconciled with the support of Kadyrov, Moscow is likely not considering him as a future leader of Chechnya. At the same time, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility of him being transferred to Moscow, as the war in Ukraine has shown that the Russian authorities have a significant shortage of high-class security personnel, and are trying to fill this gap with combat-ready and obedient Caucasians.

Our attention is also drawn to the newly appointed Speaker of Parliament, Shaid Zhamaldaev, an old bureaucrat and party functionary. Based on the information we have, Zhamaldaev, a former communist and current member of ‘Edinaia Rossia (United Russia),’ is seen as an experienced and suitable candidate for Moscow, known for his loyalty and dedication to the Kremlin. Moscow may also be considering him as a candidate for the Chechen leadership.

Given the extensive media coverage of Ramzan Kadyrov’s illness, these recent developments are both significant and noteworthy. According to the available information, Kadyrov is suffering from pancreatic necrosis, which greatly impairs his ability to work effectively. Our observations of Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent video appearances indicate that his condition is quite serious. He struggles with speech and remains motionless in the same position, and his appearance has changed so much that he is barely recognizable.

There are multiple accounts regarding the origin of his illness, including complications in his gastrointestinal tract and kidneys stemming from his contracting coronavirus. However, there is also a suggestion of medicinal poisoning associated with Chechnya’s former Minister of Health, Deputy Prime Minister, and Kadyrov’s doctor, Elkhan Suleymanov. Suleymanov, an ethnic Lezgin born in Baku, left Chechnya for personal safety reasons a long time ago and currently lives abroad.

According to available information, a medication prescribed by him caused a sharp deterioration in Ramzan Kadyrov’s health. The fact that Ramzan Kadyrov publicly denies his illness raises even more questions and suspicions.

Despite the backdrop, it is interesting to note that Kadyrov continues to appoint his family members and close friends to high-ranking positions. On May 21, 2024, his eldest son, Akhmat, was made the Minister of Sports and Physical Culture of Chechnya; his close friend Ramzan Vismuradov was appointed as the Minister of Youth Affairs; and, on June 5, his nephew Adam Cherhigov became the Minister of Transport, Communications, and Digital Development. Additionally, on January 31, Kadyrov’s daughter Khadizhat was appointed Deputy Chief of the Government Administration. The most significant change took place on July 1, 2024, when Ramzan Kadyrov’s nephew, Khamzat Kadyrov, was appointed Secretary of the Chechen Security Council. Kadyrov’s staffing policy demonstrates his continued trust in only those he considers the most loyal, and sees him bringing trusted members of his own clan together around him.

 

Conclusion

The recent personnel changes in Chechnya indicate no discussion of systemic reforms in the staffing sector. Despite his illness, Ramzan Kadyrov continues to consolidate the positions of his clan, though Moscow, as always, has its own interests, and is already grooming alternative candidates to succeed Kadyrov in the future. The ongoing processes in Ukraine will have a significant impact, as the Kremlin currently relies heavily on Kadyrov in the occupied territories.

However, there is a noteworthy detail: Moscow needs Ramzan Kadyrov as a vassal and supportive military force, and yet the Chechen leader seems more focused on his well-being and business expansion than the Kremlin’s interests. Kadyrov’s excessive involvement in Ukraine’s economic sector and the seizure of huge enterprises is likely not welcomed in the Kremlin, nor Lubyanka, nor among Russia’s military establishment, who covet such lucrative spoils for themselves. Separately, the Russian oligarchy views Ukraine’s territory as a “gold mine,” and Kadyrov’s competition poses a serious problem for them. Thus, Russia’s political, economic, and military elite may gradually seek to restrict Kadyrov’s appetite.

In this context, we believe that by transferring Apti Alaudinov and Khuchiev to Moscow, the Kremlin is already preparing for the post-Kadyrov era, perhaps by trying to create independent centres of political power in Chechnya, aiming to decentralize power so that it is not concentrated in the hands of a single strong ruler.