Author: Mamuka Komakhia

 

The political crisis that began in Georgia’s Russian-occupied Abkhazia region on November 15 ended with an agreement between the de facto government and opposition representatives. According to the agreement, the de facto President, Aslan Bzhania, resigned on November 19, several months before the expiration of his term. Unlike previous cases, this time Russian government officials were not directly involved in resolving the political crisis.

What did the De Facto Government and Opposition Agree on?

On November 15, the de facto parliament of the occupied Abkhazia was scheduled to ratify the so-called investment agreement it had concluded with Russia, however, due to protests, the issue was removed from the agenda. Despite this, opponents gathered at the “government” building complex, broke through the iron barriers, and occupied the “parliament,” “presidential administration” and “government” buildings. De facto President Aslan Bzhania took refuge in his native village of Tamish, from where he rules the “country.”

The crisis ended with Bzhania’s resignation on November 19. As a result of eight hours of negotiations between the de facto government and the opposition representatives, the following was agreed:

  • Bzhania would write his resignation letter;
  • The protesters would leave the “government” building complex on November 19, otherwise Bzhania would retract his resignation letter;
  • The de facto parliament would consider Bzhania’s resignation letter on November 19;
  • Bzhania’s “Vice President,” Badra Gunba, would serve as the interim “head of state”, dismissing Alexander Ankvab from the post of de facto Prime Minister and appointing Valeri Bganba to the Interestingly, Bganba has served as “president” twice, in 2014 and 2020.
  • At this stage, all “ministers,” including the heads of the Law Enforcement Agencies, are to retain their positions.

All points of the agreement have been fulfilled.

What Triggered the Political Crisis?

The political crisis was triggered by the intention to ratify a so-called investment agreement (the “Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Abkhazia on the implementation of investment projects by Russian legal entities on the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia”), the implementation of which was envisaged by the so-called Program for Harmonization of Legislation, of November 12, 2020 (“Program for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia on the Basis of Harmonization of the Legislation of the Republic of Abkhazia with the Legislation of the Russian Federation”). According to the program, the legislation necessary for cooperation in the investment sphere was to be adopted by 2023, however, due to internal resistance, Bzhania was unable to fulfill this obligation to Moscow in a timely manner.

This year, pressure on Bzhania from the Russian authorities has increased. Russia has imposed certain sanctions on occupied Abkhazia, partially cutting off financial assistance from September 1, and determining commercial prices for electricity supply to Abkhazia in the autumn-winter period. Amid this growing pressure from Russia, the Russian Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, and the de facto Minister of Economy of Abkhazia, Kristina Ozgan, signed the so-called investment agreement on October 30, in Moscow.

The de facto government viewed the agreement as the only viable means to attract investment to the territory of Abkhazia, while the opposition argued that the ratification of the agreement would create an imbalance, favoring Russian oligarchs over local entrepreneurs. They contended that the agreement would grant significant advantages to these oligarchs, ultimately leading to job losses and a loss of income for the local population. Among the Russian oligarchs, the name of Alexander Tkachev, a former governor of the Krasnodar region and the Russian Minister of Agriculture, who has his own business interests in Abkhazia and is considered an influential player in Abkhazian political and economic life, is most often mentioned.

This was not the first case to result in protests from opponents of the de facto government. Last year, the de facto government summoned lawmakers in the dead of night to support the controversial transfer of the so-called Bichvinta state country house to Russia. The issue of the so-called apartment law is also particularly contentious, which the opposition claims is a well-structured plan by Bzhania’s team to allow Russian citizens to purchase property in Abkhazia. The issue of real estate ownership in the region is highly sensitive, with many in Abkhazia fearing that granting this right to Russian citizens is tantamount to losing control over their land and so-called sovereignty.

A History of “Presidential” Resignations

Abkhazia has a long history of political crises and “presidential” resignations, but the current crisis differs from previous cases in that, this time, representatives of the Russian government did not directly intervene as mediators in the resolution of the crisis.

In 2004-2005, during the selection of a successor to Vladislav Ardzinba, Moscow supported Raul Khajimba, while Abkhaz “voters”backed Sergey Bagapsh. Despite several calls for fresh “presidential elections”, Bagapsh was declared “president”, with Khajimba as “vice president”.

The first case of “presidential” resignation occurred in 2014, when then-opposition leader Raul Khajimba campaigned against the incumbent “president,” Alexander Ankvab. To resolve the political crisis, Russian government officials supervising the occupied regions, the Russian Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov, and the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council Rashid Nurgaliyev, arrived from Moscow. Through Surkov’s brokering, Ankvab resigned and Khajimba won the new “presidential elections.”

The next political crisis that resulted in the resignation of a “president” occurred in January 2020. Khajimba, who had himself became “president” following a similar crisis, was forced to leave office due to growing domestic political pressure, and as a result of the mediation of Russian government officials supervising the occupied region: again, Surkov and Nurgaliyev. Aslan Bzhania won the new “presidential election,” and Alexander Ankvab became the “prime minister.”

The Russian Response to the Recent Crisis

This November, for the first time, Russian mediators did not take an active role in resolving the political crisis in Abkhazia. Vladislav  Nurgaliyev, a key figure in previous negotiations, holds the same position in the Russian Security Council, while Surkov no longer works in the government. It was expected that the traditional mechanism would be activated and Kremlin government officials would play the role of mediators between the opposing sides, but this time the Kremlin chose a different tactic. The content of telephone calls allegedly made in Moscow throughout the crisis is unknown, but Moscow’s public stance is clear: the Kremlin considers the opposition to be the main culprit in the political crisis. The Russian media also accused the opposition of fomenting anti-Russian sentiment.

On November 15, Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, claimed, “the opposition failed to resolve the disagreements through a civilized dialogue with the country’s legitimate authorities and went beyond the legal framework.” According to Zakharova, such a scenario does not contribute to attracting foreign investment, which is a key factor for the socio-economic development of Abkhazia, and, along with the Ministry of Economic Development, she urged Russian tourists to avoid visiting Abkhazia.On November 18, Dmitry Peskov, Putin’s Press Secretary, reiterated that “bilateral relations between Russia and Abkhazia are a very important priority of [Moscow’s] foreign policy.” He also emphasized the importance of adhering to the constitutional framework.

Russian media outlets, including Channel One, have labeled the opposition as “putschists,” signaling Moscow’s support for Bzhania. In this context, it is interesting that on November 18, Vladimir Putin invited Bzhania to Russia’s 2025 ‘May 9th’ ceremonial event.

Anti-Russian Opposition?

Bzhania accused the opposition of inciting anti-Russian sentiment, particularly with regard to the so-called investment agreement and the transfer of the Bichvinta state country house to Russia. Bzhania portrays the opposition as hostile to deepening Russian-Abkhazian relations, suggesting that they are supported by the Western-funded non-governmental sector. The Russian media and propagandistsalso pressured Bzhania to adopt a law regulating foreign agents, which would restrict and control the activities of Western international and non-governmental organizations on the territory of Abkhazia. However, the de facto government has faced significant resistance to this law, and the fact remains unresolved.

Despite the claims, the accusation that the Abkhazian opposition is anti-Russian is overstated. No organized anti-Russian political groups exist in Russian-occupied Abkhazia, as all political groups recognize Russia as the region’s main ally, on whose economic support their existence depends. The accusation of anti-Russian sentiments serves more as a tool of political struggle that the de facto government is using against the opposition. The opposition’s resistance to the investment agreement, the apartment law, and the Bichvinta state country house primarily reflects internal political dynamics, with concerns that such measures could change Abkhazia’s demographic makeup and undermine its sovereignty. This is also a struggle between different political and business factions, both within Abkhazia and Russia, for control over profitable economic projects.

The Georgian Government’s Response

As per the longstanding policy of the Georgian Dream government, official Tbilisi has largely ignored the processes taking place in the occupied region. In a rare comment, the Speaker of the Parliament referred to the instability as a consequence of the occupation and the absence of functioning institutions. He noted that “gray zones” created by occupation regimes lead to destabilization, but refrained from labeling the situation as an attempt at annexation.

What to Expect

  • Early “presidential elections” are expected to be held in February, and, according to preliminary data, Bzhania also plans to participate. The appointment of a “vice-president” as the interim “president,” and the retention of “ministers” until the new “elections,”despite the opposition’s demands to the contrary, will allow Bzhania to use administrative resources in the pre-election process. Although Bzhania has been discredited, he has indirectly received Moscow’s support and may therefore rejoin the struggle.

  • Kremlin-controlled media outlets have called the Abkhaz oppositionists putschists, and other statements made in Moscow do not bode well for the opposition. However, the history of “presidential elections” in Abkhazia shows that the Kremlin’s favorite does not always win in Abkhazia, especially given that opposition leaders may also have patrons in the Russian government who did not like Bzhania’s policies.

  • Regardless of who becomes the new “president” of Abkhazia, Russia’s key priority remains ensuring that Sokhumi fulfills its commitments under the “investment agreement” that lost Bzhania his job. Moscow has become increasingly assertive, signaling that it will not hesitate to impose economic and financial sanctions if Abkhazia fails to comply with its obligations. These sanctions, should they be expanded, will present a significant challenge to any future administration in Abkhazia.