Author: Vasil Ghlonti

 

Introduction

On May 24, 2024, Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, hosted the 54th meeting of the Council of Heads of Security Services and Special Services of the Commonwealth of Independent States. This noteworthy event was chaired by Kamchibek Tashiev, the head of the National Security Committee, at the Ala-Archa state residence. President Sadir Zhaparov of Kyrgyzstan also delivered a speech at the meeting, emphasizing the need to strengthen the role of special services and improve their work due to growing threats. He also highlighted the importance of constructive dialogue and joint efforts to ensure the security of CIS states.

The participants discussed various issues, including the fight against organized crime, international terrorism, religious extremism, and cybercrime, as well as regional stability and other current security concerns. They agreed to develop ways to improve the exchange of information in the field of security and the fight against terrorism, including through the international database operated by the National Anti-Terrorism Committee.

Against this background, during the session, the Russian delegation, consisting of FSB Chief Alexander Bortnikov and the head of foreign intelligence Sergei Naryshkin, stood out with their active participation and anti-Western statements.

In our blog, we will discuss and analyze the statements made by the officials of the Council of Security Services and Special Services of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States(CIS).

Statements of the Russian delegation

The meeting of the CIS’s Council Security Services and Special Services Heads of the member states held in Bishkek suggests that the Russian government and its special services are preparing for a significant and open confrontation with the political, economic, financial, and military circles, as well as the special services, of the West. This should be a matter of serious concern for the political elite of Georgia. The anti-Western statements made by the heads of the Russian special services indicate this intention.

Among the topics raised by the Russian side, particular attention should be given to issues related to the South Caucasus and “colour revolutions.” It appears that Russia is struggling to accept the potential loss of its influence over the post-Soviet space, including the South Caucasus and Central Asian republics.

Accordingly, the Kremlin will likely intensify political, economic, and military pressure on these two critical regions to maintain and strengthen its existing positions. Russia will probably utilise a significant network of influence agents, embedded within state structures, big business, and various societal layers in these countries. Such actions could potentially trigger internal political conflicts in several states, including Georgia.

Our attention was particularly drawn to the statement made by Alexander Bortnikov, the head of the FSB of Russia, in which he directly accused Western countries of interfering in the former USSR and now independent republics. He predicted a new wave of colour revolutions. His traditional anti-Western rhetoric, claiming that “the political centres of the West are trying to create parallel governments from the citizens of post-Soviet countries to replace existing governments during revolutions, internal political crises, and mass riots,” is not new to us. However, his assertion that “the West will actively use influence agencies, the non-governmental sector, opposition parties, and non-profit organizations for this” is noteworthy and thought-provoking.

It seems that Bortnikov’s sharp and provocative statements are intended to encourage post-Soviet countries’ authorities to take repressive actions against the opposition and non-governmental sector. These statements may be aimed at creating internal political tensions in independent states, such as Georgia, potentially leading to mass unrest and even civil war. The Kremlin may seek to gain the support of the Georgian government in this situation. Furthermore, given the recent adoption of undemocratic laws by Georgian Dream deputies, and the subsequent international sanctions, it is most likely that Russia will aim to strengthen its relations with the ruling party in Georgia by openly supporting the adoption of such laws.

In the current context, it is important to note the ongoing political developments in Armenia, where the Kremlin is actively involved. The new government of Armenia has chosen a pro-Western path for the country’s development and has announced its intention to join European structures. As a result, Russia has openly confronted Armenia and even temporarily recalled its ambassador for consultations. There is a possibility that pro-Kremlin forces within Armenia will attempt a counter-revolution to overthrow Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.

Amidst this backdrop, there are concerns voiced by the head of Lubyanka (Russian Federal Security Service headquarters) that the United States and Great Britain are aiming to gain full control over trade and financial operations in the CIS under the guise of imposing sanctions on Russian partners. The goal behind this alleged attempt is said to be the capability to destabilize the economy of any state within this political union. He also suggests that political and economic pressure is being exerted on the CIS countries in order to establish various forms of cooperation in defense. These provocative statements by Bortnikov indicate that the Kremlin and Lubyanka are wary of the independent rights of the states that were once part of the Soviet Empire to engage with NATO and the European Union. The fear seems to stem from the possibility that CIS countries could leave the political union under Russia’s influence and potentially seek to join the European Union and NATO, much like Ukraine and Georgia. Moldova and Armenia are seen as potentially following a similar path.

The war against Ukraine stands out as one of the most reckless actions taken by Russia, significantly altering the global agenda, and impacting international processes. In this context, we are particularly interested in a statement made by Bortnikov during the same meeting: “To fight the Russian army, foreign mercenaries are being sent to Ukraine, led by the special services of NATO member states, and these same international forces are attempting to open a second front in Moldova.” In our assessment, Lubyanka’s chief’s notable interest in the Ukraine-Moldova situation is partly due to Russia’s inability to establish a direct land connection with the separatist region of Moldova, the so-called Republic of Transnistria, because of the ongoing war with Ukraine.

This has caused concern for the Kremlin because it has lost the leverage needed to influence Moldova due to the war. One of Russia’s strategic goals may be to establish a direct land connection with the European Union and have a border with it. It is expected that Russia will try to occupy Ukraine and Moldova completely in pursuit of this goal.

The fact that Russia is still closely monitoring the former Soviet republics, including the countries of Central Asia, is confirmed by Bortnikov’s statement during one past session that, “near the southern borders of the CIS, on the territory of Afghanistan, new training camps for training terrorists are being established under the supervision of the Western special services and the military.” He was discussing this in 2023. The head of the Lubyanka believes that this is “the result of the Anglo-Saxons’ efforts to establish a foothold in Central Asia and gain influence in the region.” In this context, we are reminded of the recent statement by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin that the West intends to control the natural resources and logistics routes of Central Asia and change local governments through colour revolutions. The Russian political elite likely fears that the West will displace Russia from Central Asia and the South Caucasus, similar to how it occurred in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. In this context, it is noteworthy that Bortnikov even praised the controversial regime of the “Taliban.” In his view, external forces could have brought order to the country if the “Taliban” had not interfered. This suggests that the Russian side is willing to cooperate with this controversial regime to weaken the West’s influence in the region.

Against this background, in order to prevent the penetration and strengthening of terrorist organizations in Central Asia, Russia even allowed Iran to bolster its presence in Tajikistan by building a factory for the production of military drones. However, it is difficult to determine how effective this strategy has been. It is a fact that many terrorist organizations worldwide are composed of ethnic Tajiks and citizens of other Central Asian republics. This situation, in our estimation, is caused by the pervasive poverty and unemployment in Tajikistan, which create a fertile ground for people to engage in terrorist activities, as well as drug and weapons smuggling.

This is evidenced by the large-scale terrorist attack that took place on March 22, 2024, at the Crocus Hill concert hall in Krasnogorsk, a suburb of Moscow. The perpetrators were officially identified as Tajik nationals affiliated with the terrorist organization “Islamic Caliphate-Khorasan Province.”

At a meeting held in Bishkek, Alexander Bortnikov made a remarkable statement: He confirmed the accuracy of information provided by the US special services that the Afghan-Pakistani branch of the “Islamic Caliphate” was behind the terrorist attack. This clearly demonstrates that the US special services are more competent and informed in the fight against terrorism than their Russian counterparts in intelligence, counter-intelligence, and anti-terrorism. Notably, Bortnikov also accused Ukrainian military intelligence of complicity in the Crocus Hill terrorist attack, effectively alleging that Ukraine has close ties with the “Islamic Caliphate.”

In our view, the Russian side is attempting to foster negative sentiments towards Ukrainians among its population and to encourage more active participation in hostilities against them. Additionally, by making such serious accusations, the Russian special services likely aim to damage Ukraine’s image on the international stage.

It is important to note that Sergei Naryshkin, the head of Russian foreign intelligence, echoed Alexander Bortnikov’s anti-Western statements during the session. Of particular interest was Naryshkin’s statement regarding Slovakia’s Prime Minister, Robert Fico. Naryshkin attributed a terrorist attack on Fico to the “liberal elites” of the West, claiming that they dislike Fico due to his prioritization of Slovakian national interests. This emphasizes Naryshkin’s focus on the “liberal elites” of the West rather than the West as a whole.

Despite the competition between the services led by Alexander Bortnikov and Sergei Naryshkin, the Russian special services share similar anti-Western positions on foreign policy and international security issues. These align with the stance of the Kremlin’s head, President Vladimir Putin.

 

Conclusion

In our opinion, the gathering of the heads of the special services of the CIS countries in Bishkek underscores the significant attention that Russian special services pay to the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Kremlin considers these regions a “soft underbelly” through which external forces can seriously harm Russian interests. Recent developments suggest that Moscow equates pro-Western, democratic forces with terrorists and seeks to neutralize them. Moreover, the Kremlin fears democratic ideas more than threats from terrorist organizations. This is evident in its negative stance towards democratic, progressive forces, particularly in its attitude towards the Georgian pro-Western opposition and the current government of Armenia.

While Moscow is undoubtedly concerned about the terrorist threat, especially after the attack at the Crocus Hill concert hall in Krasnogorsk, it views global terrorist organizations as destructive forces managed by Western special services and connected with Ukrainian intelligence. Such phobias in the Kremlin indicate a crisis within the Russian government, making it even more unpredictable and dangerous.