Author: Gela Khmaladze

 

In general, government legitimacy is a political concept. Legitimacy can be understood as the legality of a given government, however, not only from a purely legal point of view. The recognition and psychological acceptance of a government by the majority of its population, as well as by the international community, are crucial factors. It is also important that the government’s decisions and actions align with the expectations of both domestic society and international partners. As a result, we can differentiate between internal and external legitimacy.

Internal legitimacy refers to the recognition of the government within the country, where the majority of the population perceives it as fair.  This includes the belief that its decisions align with the norms of the society’s political culture and that the political order is conducive to the effective functioning of the state. Internal legitimacy also refers to the degree the government and society consolidate to solve the problems facing the state.

It is worth briefly examining the challenges facing the authorities of the Russian Federation regarding both internal and external legitimacy. It is also important to understand to what extent the Moscow regime has the internal stability resources to continue its hostile actions and expansionist policies.

 

Regime Stability – Feigned or Real?

 

Following the military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the government of the Russian Federation faced significant problems in terms of external legitimacy. On March 17, 2023, the International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant for the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, for unlawful deportation of children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Russia. On April 17, 2024, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution on the illegitimacy of Putin’s election and also called on EU member States to cease all contact with him, except for humanitarian purposes and in the pursuit of peace.

After being elected as president for the fifth term in March 2024 and being inaugurated on May 7, Putin embarked on an extensive international tour, visiting eight countries over the course of about three to four months – mostly member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Asian neighbors of the Russian Federation.

There is a clear trend indicating that, through these visits, Putin seeks to demonstrate to the world that despite the war against Ukraine and Western sanctions, Russia still has the capacity for foreign policy maneuvering, retains international support, and maintains influential partners. For President Putin, such visits have more symbolic and reputational value than the intergovernmental protocol agreements signed during them. In doing so, he clearly aims to restore his compromised external legitimacy.

Against the background of that challenged external legitimacy, the internal legitimacy of President Putin’s government appears, at first glance, to be unthreatened. Along with the stability of the Moscow regime, the ideological and value balance between the government and the majority of the Russian society is maintained.

From this perspective, considering the developments of recent years, the majority of the Russian population has accepted the legitimacy of Putin’s election as president for the fifth term, especially after the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in March 2020 recognized as legal the amendments to the Constitution adopted by the State Duma on the termination of previous presidential terms.

Putin used the unprecedentedly high figures recorded in the presidential elections of March 15-17, both in terms of voter turnout and support for the incumbent president, to strengthen his own legitimacy. He attempted to present the “special military operation” and confrontation with the democratic world as not being driven by his personal political ambition, but as the existential choice of the absolute majority of the population of the Russian Federation.

It is a fact that Russian society has largely adapted to the war against Ukraine and its political repercussions with minimal disruption. Isolation from the democratic world and the Western sanctions did not result in mass protests among Russian society. The strong support among the majority of the Russian population for the objectives of the “special military operation” announced by President Putin has remain unchanged over the two and a half years of hostilities.

At the same time, there are no obvious signs of an economic crisis in Russia. The federal government managed to quickly and easily substitute the sanctioned imported goods. Incomes have rocketed, especially for the lowest-income groups, and unemployment and poverty rates have reached historic lows. There is a form of public agreement among the regional and business elites– they enjoy economic freedom on the condition that they maintain complete loyalty to the existing regime.

In light of the war with Ukraine, the main goal of the Putin regime is to keep public anxiety from approaching a critical level. To do so, the Russian government seeks to distance the public from the actual political decision-making process, to keep it passive and therefore avoiding accountability for the regime’s choices.

President Putin’s tendency to distance himself from the political or social crises within Russia has become a defining characteristic of his rule. Since August 6, when the Ukrainian Armed Forces occupied part of the Kursk region, the Russian President has not visited the region, and consistently avoids public discussion of the topic.

 

From Politician to Historic Figure

 

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, President Putin has been deliberately trying to turn himself from a politician into a national leader and historic figure. Generally, a politician is elected and is accountable to the voters; with various mechanisms in place within the state to oversee the actions of politicians at all levels. A historic figure is not subject to such control, however, and legitimizes himself by scoring personal points. Putin considers the return of “historical Russian lands” and the foreign expansion of the Russian Federation as ways to score such points, and the ultimate goal of his activity is to transform Russia into a global geopolitical pole.

In the event of even a slight manifestation of social dissatisfaction or protest in the state, the responsibility is easily transferred to the lower links of the government – subordinates, whose dismissal and replacement is never an issue. A historic figure is also inviolable in this regard. As a national leader, Putin has transformed from being an accountable politician into an arbiter who regulates and resolves conflicts between different social groups and ruling clans.

 

A Message to the Regions

 

From the point of view of internal legitimacy, Putin’s recent regional visits were also noteworthy. On August 20, he visited three federal subjects of the North Caucasus Federal District – the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Chechnya), and on September 2, he visited the Republic of Tuva. We believe that these republics were not chosen randomly; rather, it was likely a strategic political decision coming from the advisers of the Russian president.

In the last two presidential elections in  Russia (in 2018 and 2024), the republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya and Tuva ranked among the top five regions where Putin received the highest number of electoral votes. Where the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria was in the lead with 93.38% in the 2018 presidential elections, in 2024, the highest rate of support for the incumbent president of Russia was recorded in the Republic of Chechnya and totaled 98.99%.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that the mentioned three republics consistantly rank among the lowest among the federal subjects of Russia in terms of their indicators of socio-economic development. At first glance, it is in these republics that society should have the most grounds for discontent and mistrust of the government. However, the real situation suggests that the high level of support for the Russian president can only be attributed to one factor: widespread corruption, the strong influence of local ruling clans on society, and the pressure of the authoritarian regime preventing voters from making free choices.

We believe that Putin’s visits to these republics serve as a gesture of gratitude and a clear signal to local loyal elites that the Kremlin will continue to support them, and that the federal government’s policy in the regions will not change in the near future.

 

In conclusion, it can be said that Russian totalitarian society’s loyalty to the current regime, powerful internal economic resources, as well as situational cooperation with allied authoritarian regimes, are the key factors which determine the stability of the Russian government and serve as sources of its legitimacy.

The potential delegitimization of the current government could hinge on various factors; however, we conclude that two primary reasons might trigger the delegitimization process:

  1. An irreversible economic crisis and a sharp deterioration in the standard of living of the majority of the population;
  2. When the current government is no longer able to protect the population from internal and external threats, the population will begin to defend its own security and basic rights.

It is, however, highly unlikely that the current government of the Russian Federation will find itself in danger of being delegitimized. Indeed, it seems that President Putin’s regime has sufficient political resources to remain at the helm of the country for an indefinite period of time to come.