Author: Irakli Koplatadze

 

With its third stage of expansion, known as BRICS+, the bloc has extended its reach directly to Georgia’s borders from the north (with Russia as a founding member since 2009), the south (with Turkey formally asking to join the group on September 2, 2024), and the east (with Azerbaijan applying on August 20, 2024, and Iran officially joining the organization on January 1, 2024).

Amid this shifting geopolitical landscape, Georgia’s stalled accession to the EU and NATO has coincided with Russia’s growing propaganda push for Georgia to join BRICS. The bloc’s expansion reflects broader political realignments shaping the global and regional order, among them the anticipated end of the Russia-Ukraine war, the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, the Azerbaijani-Armenian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, the Trump administration’s increasingly hardline stance on Iran and China, the EU’s decision to open accession talks with Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans, and Georgia’s apparent drift from the Western sphere, despite its status as a candidate for the European Union and an aspirant for NATO. Against the backdrop of this shifting world order, key questions arise: What are BRICS’ strategic objectives in its expansion? How will the new US administration respond to these developments? And what is Georgia’s stance on BRICS at this stage?

From the very first stage of the bloc’s establishment, Brazil, Russia, India, and China (acronym BRIC, 2009), and during the second stage when South Africa joined the group (acronym BRICS, 2010–2022), and especially in the third stage, when the number of member states increased to nine following the accession of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (acronym BRICS+, 2024), the bloc  has sought to establish itself as an alternative to the West and a key hub for multilateralism (reshaping multilateralism). Further, Cuba, Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey are considered partner countries of BRICS, having expressed interest in joining. These 13 countries attended the 16th BRICS Summit in Kazan (Russia) in October 2024, where a total of 40 countries expressed interest in joining, while 23 formally submitted applications, Azerbaijan among them. Notably, due to intensified internal integration processes, a decision on large-scale expansion was not made at the summit. Argentina initially submitted an application, but later pulled out of plans to join the bloc following a change in government, while Saudi Arabia is still considering its membership.

Against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian and Middle East conflicts, the bloc’s founding members are increasingly signaling that BRICS+ aims at positioning itself as a challenge to Western multilateralism, specifically:

  • BRICS+ is viewed as a coalition supporting the “Global South” and as an alternative to G7. It seeks to attract not only the politically “anti-Western” states (Russia, China, Iran) but also so-called “swing states” like Brazil, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa, which do not rule out trade, economic, or military-political cooperation with either the West or the “anti-Western” bloc.
  • The New Development Bank (NDB), established by BRICS countries in Shanghai in 2015, is considered an alternative to the World Bank. It funds projects ranging from increasing China’s liquefied natural gas transportation capacity to modernizing South Africa’s freight railway systems.
  • Like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), BRICS plans to establish its own currency reserve mechanism.
  • In March 2019, BRICS announced the development of its own payment system, BRICS-Pay, as an alternative to SWIFT.

The bloc’s anti-American stance was reflected in the final declaration adopted at the BRICS Summit in Russia in October 2024, which stated that the coalition supports the expansion of local currency financing by the NDB and the strengthening of innovations in investment and financial instruments. This prompted a strong reaction from the United States. On November 30, 2024, US president-elect Donald Trump threatened to impose 100% tariffs on BRICS countries if the bloc adopts its own currency or any other currency to replace the US dollar in its commercial transactions.  Trump stated that the US would no longer “stand by and watch” as BRICS countries attempt to abandon the dollar as the currency used in international trade transactions. Trump’s remarks quickly drew responses from BRICS member states. On December 2, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that if the US forces BRICS countries to use the dollar, it will only strengthen their trend towards using national currencies, while Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the urgent need for BRICS countries to accelerate the use of their national currencies for trade and investment, but noted that it is too early to discuss creating a single currency for the group. South Africa released an official statement to affirm no common currency was planned, and India’s foreign minister insisted that BRICS nations had “no interest in weakening the US dollar.”

Accordingly, the current focus is less on issuing a new currency and more on attempts to push the US dollar out of trade (“de-dollarization”) by encouraging transactions in national currencies among member states. Specifically, the aforementioned NDB is increasingly seeking to finance development projects and conduct trade transactions in local currencies. However, executing international trade in this manner, even among a group of up to ten countries, remains challenging. For instance, while India may want to purchase more Russian oil, it can only do so if it finds Russian buyers for Indian goods. Otherwise, it cannot acquire the desired volume of oil, as trading in rubles or rupees becomes unstable and unprofitable for Moscow, which has limited options for spending the rupees it will receive. Countries like the United Arab Emirates, which have long served as a financial clearing hub for competing geopolitical blocs, have been attempting to achieve a similar outcome for at least a decade. However, the issue has gained greater relevance over the past two to three years amid escalating “geopolitical fragmentation” and “trade wars.” Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, efforts to bypass dollar transactions have also been driven by a desire to evade Western sanctions. The number of dual-use goods and financial corporations subject to US and EU sanctions has increased significantly, prompting Russia to demonstrate to the US and European countries that isolating Moscow is not possible. On the other hand, the growing volume of transactions conducted in national currencies could, over time, pose a real challenge to the dominance of the US dollar in the global economy, considering BRICS’ geographical reach and financial-trade scale.

Currently, the BRICS countries are home to approximately 3.3 billion people – more than 40% of the world’s population – and their economies account for 37.3% of global GDP (calculated at purchasing power parity). Additionally, according to S&P Global, with the inclusion of Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and potentially Saudi Arabia, the BRICS+ group could control nearly 50% of global oil production while consuming 35% of it. In 2024, according to the International Labour Organization, the labor force participation rate within the bloc stood at 60.6%, totaling 1.5 billion people. However, a significant gender gap remains: men account for 73.9% of the employed workforce, while women make up just 47.4%. Furthermore, employment in the informal economy is notably high, with approximately 934.4 million people working outside formal labor structures – the majority concentrated in India. As of 2024, the unemployment rate across BRICS countries stood at 5.3%, affecting a total of 84.7 million people.

        As for Georgia’s relationship with BRICS, the issue emerged on the agenda following a sharp shift in the country’s foreign policy direction. However, despite pursuing an anti-American and anti-European course, the ruling Georgian Dream government has yet to propose any clear alternative regarding which multilateral or regional cooperation framework it envisions for the country. This uncertainty is further compounded by the fact that the so-called 3+3 format is currently considered taboo even for Georgian Dream, while the future of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Middle Corridor remains uncertain (this assessment does not take into account bilateral relations, such as expanding trade and economic ties with Russia and Iran, or deepening investment and financial cooperation with China and Azerbaijan. It also excludes large-scale infrastructure projects like the construction of the Anaklia Deep Sea Port or the Black Sea Submarine Cable).

In the current geopolitical context, promoting BRICS membership as an alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration has become a part of Russian propaganda in Georgia. On October 27, 2024, the day after Georgia’s parliamentary elections, Kremlin propagandist Alexander Dugin stated: “Georgian Dream must bring Georgia into BRICS. Sovereigntists are coming to power in Georgia again. They are not at all pro-Russian, but they are not Western serfs either. This is what nationalism in a good sense means – to preserve the homeland, maintain order, strengthen independence from everyone, and not bow down to anyone. […] It is also time to bid farewell to the unpopular and Georgiaphobic president. It is time for her to go home to Paris.” Similar narratives about the 3+3 format and BRICS were disseminated by Imedi TV and Saqinform, with articles such as “Why Georgia Should Aspire to Join BRICS and Not the EU.” As experience shows, at the initial stage, such statements by propagandists, rather than high-ranking political officials, lay the ideological groundwork for future political decisions. Indeed, amid growing confrontation with the West, the Georgian government’s positions have increasingly aligned with BRICS’ perspectives. Clear examples include: Political statements regarding Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, particularly blaming Ukraine and the US for provoking the war, a low rate (49%) of alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), repeated Western and Ukrainian protests over the risks of dual-use goods trade, the resumption of direct flights with Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, the establishment of a strategic partnership with China, high-level and controversial visits to Iran, the November 28 announcement of a moratorium on EU accession negotiations until at least 2028 (a sharp democratic backslide, further exacerbated by fraudulent elections, mass crackdowns on civil protests, arbitrary arrests, and repressive legal measures in criminal and public service law). These developments have effectively led to the suspension of practical relations with the EU and the breakdown of Georgia’s strategic partnership with the US.

Considering the above, in the context of self-isolation from the West, closer ties with BRICS offer the ruling Georgian Dream Party an opportunity to maintain power, exact political “revenge” on the West, find like-minded partners in the “Global South” and deepen cooperative relations. Such a shift is typically framed as a need to keep “strategic autonomy” by balancing relations with both the West and the “Global South.” However, if Georgia undergoes democratic changes and returns to the Western orbit, like Argentina, the issue of joining BRICS will naturally lose relevance, as bilateral relations with member states will take precedence. This is especially true given that Georgia has already signed free trade agreements with China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia (in trade with the latter, the criteria defined by Article 1 and Article 2 of the Free Trade Agreement between Georgia and Russia applies).

It is important to emphasize that the BRICS+ countries, which are largely characterized by authoritarian regimes, non-democratic state institutions, weak human rights protections, and opaque, less competitive internal markets, will be unable to prevail in a direct confrontation with the European and Euro-Atlantic alliance. This is because the combined economy of the Western world (including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other allies) vastly exceeds BRICS’ 37.3%, its military forces are significantly superior, its geographical positioning is more strategic, its values are more appealing, and its democratic system is far more stable and well-established.

 

Summary

  • With its gradual expansion, BRICS seeks to present itself as an alternative to the West and a new center of gravity for multilateralism. It utilizes the NDB mechanism to promote de-dollarization and encourage transactions in member states’ national currencies, which is also driven by Russia’s desire to circumvent sanctions imposed on trade involving military and dual-use goods.
  • President Trump firmly outlined the US response towards BRICS members in his statement on November 30, 2024.
  • Against the backdrop of Georgia’s disengagement from the EU accession process, and BRICS expansion reaching the country’s northern, southern, and eastern borders, the narrative of Georgia’s “need” to join BRICS is purely propagandistic and lacks any economic justification.
  • Due to its incompatibility with EU membership, the issue of Georgia joining BRICS automatically loses relevance once the country resumes its course towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. However, this does not prevent Georgia from maintaining bilateral trade and economic cooperation with BRICS member states.