Author: Mamuka Komakhia

 

On March 1, 2025, Kremlin favorite Badra Gunba won the second round of illegitimate presidential elections in Russian-occupied Abkhazia. The very next day, Russian President Vladimir Putin congratulated Gunba on his victory, forcing Gunba’s opponents to accept their defeat and face the fact they will have to wait for a new chance at political revenge. The defeated Adgur Ardzinba recognized the results of the “elections,” but did not congratulate Gunba on his win. Gunba’s “inauguration” will take place 30 days after the announcement of the final results.

Why Were Early “Presidential Elections” Held?

As a result of early illegitimate presidential elections, Badra Gunba has become the next “president” of occupied Abkhazia. The early “elections” were called in response to the escalating political crisis, which had been growing over the past few years. Several issues, particularly related to the opposition and various parts of society, were of urgent concern: the transfer of the Bichvinta State Country House to Russia, the draft laws on “foreign agents” and “apartments” (real estate), and the ratification of the so-called investment agreement with Russia. The investment agreement, in particular, became the tipping point for Russia, which had long tolerated the “disobedience” of its so-called “strategic ally.” Until then, Russia had avoided taking harsh measures, instead showing a degree of “understanding” toward the Abkhaz resistance. In order to expedite resolution of the issue, Moscow effectively imposed sanctions on occupied Abkhazia. This included a partial halt in funding, which led to problems with salary payments, and a refusal to help Sokhumi overcome the energy crisis. Faced with pressure from the Kremlin, de facto President Aslan Bzhania tried to ratify the “investment agreement” on November 15, but, as a result of strong opposition, he was forced to resign on November 19 and call early “presidential elections.”

The First Round

The first round of the illegitimate presidential elections was held on February 15, 2025. According to the “Central Election Commission,” 98,790 people participated in the “elections.” The votes were distributed as follows:

  • Badra Gunba (“Vice President” during Aslan Bzhaniya’s “presidency”): 45,817 votes (46.38%);
  • Adgur Ardzinba (“Minister of Economy” and “Vice Prime Minister,” 2015-2020, during Raul Khajimba’s “presidency,” leader of the Abkhaz People’s Movement opposition organization): 36,476 votes (36.92%);
  • Robert Arshba (former head of the so-called Audit Chamber): 7,434 votes (7.53%);
  • Oleg Bartsits (former “Trade Representative” of Abkhazia in Russia): 3,988 votes (4.04%);
  • Adgur Khurkhumal (Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Black Sea Development Bank): 896 votes (0.91%).

A total of 1,381 people voted against all candidates, while 2,798 ballots were declared invalid.

The “elections” were held in 152 polling districts on the territory of Abkhazia and in two polling districts in Russia – in Moscow and Cherkessk. Interestingly, the “elections” were not held in Turkey, in the Sakarya province, where descendants of Abkhaz Muhajirs live. According to the so-called Central Election Commission, the “elections” could not be held “due to the stance of the local authorities.”

The Second Round

According to the “Central Election Commission,” 70% of “voters” participated in the second round, which amounts to 100,412 people. Compared to the first round, 1,000 more “voters” turned out. 2,065 people voted against all candidates, and 1,687 ballots were declared invalid. The votes for the candidates were distributed as follows:

  • Badra Gunba: 54,954 votes (54.73%)
  • Adgur Ardzinba: 41,708 votes (41.54%)

If we exclude the votes cast against all candidates and the invalid ballots, Gunba received 57%, while Ardzinba garnered 43%.

The second round was observed by 120 international “observers” from 35 countries. Inviting “observers” to legitimize “elections” in the occupied territories is a common practice. Those who observed the “elections” were representatives from countries that have recognized the independence of Abkhazia, as well as individual private citizens from various countries with personal connections to Russia or the occupied territory. The “observers” came from countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Italy, France, and others.

How Was the Pre-Election Campaign Conducted?

Russia had previously intervened in the “presidential elections” held in Georgia’s occupied territories, but this is the first time such a large-scale interference was seen, with the Kremlin openly supporting its favorite, Badra Gunba, and mobilizing the entire Russian state apparatus and propaganda in his favor. During the pre-election period, there were several instances of this that were a new phenomenon for Abkhazia. We will explore these below.

“Pro-Russian” and “Anti-Russian” Candidates

For the first time, the main candidates participating in the “elections” were labeled as “pro-Russian” and “anti-Russian.” Kremlin’s favorite, Badra Gunba, was labeled a pro-Russian candidate, while his opponent, Adgur Ardzinba, was referred to as an anti-Russian force in Russian media. Ardzinba’s political allies, including the main participants of the 2024 political crisis, “member of parliament” Kan Kvartchia and Abkhazia’s “hero” Levan Mikaa, were also accused of anti-Russian actions. Ardzinba, along with these allies, formed the opposition triumvirate against Aslan Bzhania. Referred to as “putschists” in Russian media, they were soon stripped of their Russian citizenship. It is expected that similar sanctions will be imposed on Adgur Ardzinba and other opponents of further integration with Russia, including several well-known representatives of the non-governmental sector who are regarded as conduits for Western interests in Russia.

A Pro-Turkish Candidate?

It was a novelty to accuse a “presidential” candidate of being pro-Turkish. Along with being labeled anti-Russian, Ardzinba was also called “pro-Turkish,” and was blamed for advancing Turkish interests. A fake Turkish passport was even circulated online. One of the reasons for the closing of the polling station in Turkey was said to be the descendants of the Muhajirs’ support for Ardzinba. There was an incident where one such descendant, who was flying from Turkey to participate in the “elections,” was refused entry at Sochi Airport and sent back.

Who did the Armenians Support?

Despite the large ethnic Armenian population in occupied Abkhazia, their participation in the political process is limited to taking part in “elections.” Though their role in power distribution is minimal, in these “elections,” the vast majority of the Armenian population supported Gunba, which, according to Ardzinba’s supporters, was the result of pressure put on them and their leaders. Ardzinba was accused of anti-Armenian sentiments due to his statements and the actions of his team. Gunba’s supporters used this issue to mobilize the Armenian population in Gunba’s favor during the elections. The Russian investigative service even initiated an inquiry into ethnic Armenians who are citizens of both Abkhazia and Russia to check instances of coercion, which was undoubtedly seen as pressure on Ardzinba.

Electoral Technologies and “Black PR”

The involvement of Russian political technologists was noticeably excessive from both sides. In addition to using “black PR” tactics against each other, both sides employed various modern methods to promote their candidacies, including music videos.

For the first time in the history of the occupied region, a sociological survey was conducted regarding the “elections,” whose results suggested that the majority of respondents supported Gunba. This was the first such survey conducted in Abkhazia, and its execution and the announcement of its results caused a scandal. It was later revealed that the survey had been conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM). This immediately raised suspicions that the Kremlin had sympathies for Gunba.

Open Support for Gunba

Russia has supported specific “presidential” candidates before, but the scale of its support for Gunba was unprecedented. The open expression of support for him came with the January 31-February 1 visit of Sergey Kiriyenko, the Deputy Head of the Russian Presidential Administration overseeing the Georgian occupied regions in Abkhazia. Although Kiriyenko stated at the end of the visit that Russia would “respectfully accept the choice of the Abkhaz people,” it was clear to everyone where the influential figure’s sympathies lay.

The most noticeable sign of the Kremlin’s undisguised support for Gunba was his visit to Moscow, where he held high-level meetings with Russian government officials. On February 6, Gunba even met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, with Lavrov’s department referring to him as a “prominent political figure of the Republic of Abkhazia.”

Gunba was also the first passenger to arrive at the restored Sokhumi Airport on February 7. He returned with concrete decisions from Moscow. He revealed that Moscow was willing to reconsider the so-called investment agreement and adopt a new one that took into account the interests of both sides. Positive developments were also made regarding electricity supply and the salaries of employees in “budgetary” organizations. After a meeting with Russia’s Finance Minister, RUB 340 million was immediately transferred to Abkhazia for pensions and salaries. Additionally, issues related to electricity supply were swiftly resolved. Gunba was credited with the allocation of ambulances and school buses by Russia, and participated in the handover of these vehicles.

Administrative Resources

Following Bzhania’s resignation, a provision of the agreement to resolve the political crisis allowed members of the de facto government to retain their positions until a new “president” was elected, which enabled the mobilization of administrative resources in Gunba’s favor. Although the acting “president” Valeri Bganba dismissed the “Minister of Security” Dmitry Kuchuberia, this was not enough to prevent interference with the electoral process through administrative resources. Bganba was dissatisfied with the fact that individuals appointed to administrative positions took extended leaves, during which time they were effectively campaigning for Gunba.

Who is Badra Gunba?

Badra Gunba, 43 years old, was born in 1981, and is the first “president” of Abkhazia who did not participate in the 1992-1993 war. Gunba graduated from the Saratov State Agrarian University in 2003, majoring in Accounting and Auditing. In 2007, he became a candidate of Economic Sciences. From 2003 to 2007, he worked in various positions in the Saratov administration. In 2007, Gunba continued his career in Abkhazia, initially serving as a legal advisor in the de facto government until 2009. From 2009 to 2011, he served as the “Deputy Minister of Culture,” and from 2011 to 2014, during the “presidency” of Aleksandr Ankvab, he was the “Minister of Culture.” After Ankvab’s resignation in 2014, Gunba pursued business activities. In 2020, after Aslan Bzhania’s victory, Gunba became the “vice president”. Following Bzhania’s departure on November 19, 2024, Gunba became the “Acting President.”

Gunba’s “vice president” is Beslan Bigvava, former head of the Ochamchire district.

What Challenges Lie Ahead for Badra Gunba?

Personal Challenges

Gunba is a member of the political team of Bzhania and Ankvab. After Bzhania’s resignation, Bzhania himself initially intended to participate in the early elections, but ultimately his team and, more importantly, the Kremlin, decided to support Gunba. Ankvab instead led Gunba’s election campaign. Ankvab is one of the most experienced figures in Abkhazian politics, having maintained a strong political and business influence for years. Gunba’s political career owes much to Ankvab, and so Gunba’s challenge now will be how he can establish himself as an independent political figure and make decisions without relying on the influences of Bzhania and Ankvab.

Internal Challenge

Gunba was Bzhania’s “vice president” and, as such, is responsible for all the issues that arose during his predecessor’s tenure. Despite winning the “elections,” the causes of the political crisis have not disappeared; on the contrary, the crisis may well intensify. Since Gunba’s presidency has been legitimized by the Kremlin, it is unlikely that his opponents will be particularly active in the short term. However, within the occupied region, the division between Gunba’s supporters and those of Ardzinba is so deep that the emergence of a new political crisis seems inevitable. Gunba will be able to stave off such a crisis only if he addresses the region’s various issues in a way that does not require major concessions to Russia or Russian businesses, nor that undermines Abkhazian “sovereignty.” This remains a red line for the political opposition within Abkhazian politics.

Foreign Challenges

For Gunba, the primary external challenge will be fulfilling his obligations to Russia. It was his political team failure to meet these obligations that led to unprecedented sanctions being imposed on Abkhazia by Moscow, which, in turn, triggered the political crisis. Although Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak indicated during his meeting with Gunba that revisions to the so-called investment agreement would be made considering mutual interests, this can be viewed as mere pre-election rhetoric. Gunba will be required to meet Russia’s demands, including the ratification and implementation of the revised “investment agreement,” which will ultimately grant greater freedom to Russian businesses in Abkhazia.

Among Russia’s key demands are the adoption of the so-called “apartments law,” allowing Russian citizens to purchase property in Abkhazia, the transfer of energy infrastructure to Russia, and the adoption of the so-called foreign agents law, which would increase control over the civil sector and the activities of Western international organizations in the occupied region. These issues have sparked significant political divisions and have led to societal fragmentation in Abkhazia in recent years.

During the pre-election period, Russia’s messages were clearly communicated to the Abkhaz population, with direct warnings given that if Russia’s demands were not met, Moscow would not hesitate to impose further sanctions on its strategic ally. Without Russian support, it is impossible to address such basic issues in the occupied region as energy security and salary payments. Gunba’s primary challenge will be fulfilling Russia’s demands in a way that does not trigger a new political crisis or civil confrontation.

What Will Change for Georgia?

Georgia has no influence over the processes occurring in the Russian-occupied regions. Official Tbilisi has traditionally condemned the illegitimate elections held in occupied Abkhazia. After the first round, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, and after the second, the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality did the same. Against the backdrop of growing Georgian-Russian relations, Russia’s influence in the occupied regions is increasing, especially since Russia’s full-scale military aggression began in Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s growing influence, and the further integration of occupied Abkhazia into Russia’s political and economic system, will leave no room for Georgian-Abkhaz relations, which were already at a low.

Georgian-Abkhaz relations may face new challenges due to emerging circumstances. Over 30 years have passed since the end of the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia, and a new generation is now entering the political scene of the occupied region. Gunba is Abkhazia’s first “president” not to have participated in that war. The new generation, unlike the old, which had a common past and personal connections with Georgia, has less experience with Georgia and is more “Russified.” With the growing Russian influence over the new Abkhaz political elite, establishing bilateral relations will be even more difficult.